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LAW PATERNITY DECISIONS
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Adam and Eve sitting in a tree, k-i-s-s-i-n-g. First comes
love. Then comes marriage. Then comes Cain and Abel in the
baby carriage. The schoolyard ribbing describes the vision of the
ideal family situation - two parents with two children, living
happily ever after. That is, as long as there is no reason to question
the biological paternity of Cain and Abel. As long as Adam is sure
Cain and Abel are his biological offspring - that they look like him
- he should have no reason to question their paternity. That is how
it is supposed to be. That way, daddy can be sure his little boys
really are his.
This sentiment is not really new at all. It is the driving
force behind paternity fraud laws and court decisions in many
states that allow fathers to use the lack of a biological relationship
with their children to defeat claims for child support under the
guise of determining the privileges and responsibilities of
paternity.' Some fathers want it both ways - they want the legal
right to play daddy but they also want to trump the responsibilities
that go along with fatherhood - child support.
I told [the children] I was still their daddy, and I
loved them as much as the day they were born - the
only thing that was different was I was not their
birth father .... I would still like to go on doing
things for them, directly, but I don't see why I
t Associate Professor of Law and Director of Advocacy at Western State
University College of Law. Special thanks to Connie Hood, Susan Keller and
Michael Schwartz for their support and comments.
"Fatherhood," "Father" and "Paternity" are used interchangeably because,
although this article takes a critical look at the courts' and legislatures' rhetoric,
it is this author's contention that the truth in identifying a father is equivalent to
determining fatherhood and paternity.
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should be writing checks to a woman who deceived
2me all those years.
The man behind this bitter-sweet declaration, attempting to
disestablish his paternal relationship with three of his four children,
along with other vocal fathers 3 fighting for the skewed perspective
once biology excludes them from the child's gene pool, are no
longer fathers of the children they raised, they have become poster
children for the proponents of a biological preference in paternity
legislation.4 The biological preference in paternity fraud and
related laws promotes a conclusive presumption of non-paternity
when there is no biological connection between the father and the
child, regardless of the marital status of the man at the time of the
child's birth or the parent-child relationship. Mr. Wise's story, a
tale of a marriage in which marital infidelity resulted in three of the
couple's four children being genetically unrelated to the husband,
is becoming more common in the era of for better or better.5 Mr.
Wise, like many of the proponents of legislative change, wants to
remove res judicata and related laws making paternity
adjudications final, blocking post- and pre-judgment genetic
exclusions. Mr. Wise wants his children in his life and not just in
his pocketbook because he was not the sperm donor when they
were conceived.
The biology preference in the form of paternity fraud laws
and related statutes exists only in a minority of states, whereas the
marital presumption still exists in a majority of states. The marital
or legitimacy presumption assumes that a child born or conceived
2 Senate Judiciary Committee 2001-2002 Regular Session, Comment 5d,
(quoting In Genetic Testing for Paternity, Law Often Lags Behind Science, NEW
YORK TIMES, March 11, 2001 at 28.
3 See Lisa Sandberg, DNA doesn't define 'dad', SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
April 21, 2002, calling Wise the "poster boy for the emerging father's rights
movement." See also Nicholas Riccardi, DNA Shakes Up Child Support Law
Rights: System is challenged by men forced to pay for children who are not
theirs, Los ANGELES TIMES, April 15, 2002 (calling Caron a "child-support
celebrity").
4 See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and
the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 219
(2002).
5 See Wise v. Fryar, 49 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. App. 2001), cert. denied. 534 U.S.
1079, 122 S.Ct. 808, 151 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002).
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while the parents were married or cohabitating is the biological
offspring of the husband or male cohabitater. 6 The presumption,
however, only applies to certain types of families. These are
families where the parents were married, tried to get married, or
cohabitated with the child, and the father held the child out as his
biological child.7 It does not apply to many types of nontraditional
families, such as families where the couple never marries, legally
cannot marry as in same-sex families, or either fail to live together
at all or do not live together once the child is born but maintain a
family. Therefore, even in states that have the marital
presumption, not all families are protected against biological-based
paternity challenges.
Because nontraditional families are becoming more
prevalent, we are headed towards a society where the biological
preference is in our future if there is no limit to the biological
privilege. A biology-based paternity system will destroy the
American family, traditional and otherwise, because it eliminates
familial certainty. A family cannot survive without the certainty of
its existence. When parents divorce, the family structure changes,
but the sense of family that the children have can remain intact. If
biology-privilege laws allow a father, who raises a child for five or
ten years, to leave the family as he leaves the wife, it replaces what
little familial certainty the child has left - the identity of his
parents.
6 See Ala. Code § 26-17-5(a)(1) (1975); Alaska Stat. 18.50.160(d); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 25-814 (2000); Cal. Fan. Code § 7611 (2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19-4-
105(1)(a) (2003); Del. Code Tit. 13 Chapter 8. § 804 (a) (1)(2)(3) (2003); Haw.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 584-4 (a)(1)(2)(3) (1997); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 45/5 (a)(1)
(1997); Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1 (1)(A)(B)(2)(A)(B) (2001); Ky. Rev. Stat. §
406.011 (1972); Md. Code ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1)(1997); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 257.55 Subdiv. I (a)(b)(c) (2002); Mass. Rev. Stat 209C § 6
(a)(1)(2)(3); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.822.1 (1)(2)(3) (2002); Mont. Stat. § 40-6-
105(1)(1997); N.J. Stat. § 9:17-43(a)(1998); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-11-5 A
(1)(2)(3) (1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.051(1)(1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-17-
04 (1995); Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(2003); 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. §
5102(b)(2002); R.I. Stat. § 15-8-3(a)(2002); Tex. Fain. Code § 160.204 (2001);
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.26.116(1)(a)(b)(c)(d)(2002); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-504
(a)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv) (2002). See also Cochran v. Cochran, 717 N.E.2d 892, 894
(Ind. App. 1999); Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ind. 1997).7 1d.
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Ironically, the use of biology in determining paternity
under the marital presumption was designed to create certainty
where scientific medicine could not. Biology has been the
preferred basis of paternity determinations since the beginning of
time. Biology as a defense to paternity issues, which typically
arise in child support or custody suits, is also not new. It is the
foundation upon which paternity, support, inheritance and related
privileges and responsibilities are based. Before DNA8 testing,
there was Human Leukocyte Antigen testing, and, before that,
there was blood typing. Before that, there was bald eagle
evidence, which allowed the parent to offer evidence of the child's
likeness to the father, or lack thereof, as a basis for establishing or
contesting paternity.9 If the child looks like the father, sounds like
8 Deoxyribonucleic Acid.
9 See Jeffries v. Moore, 559 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. App. 2002), cert. granted 565
S.E.2d 665 (N.C. 2002), cert. denied 576 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 2003); Brown v.
Smith, 526 S.E.2d 686 (N.C. App. 2000) (Child's physical resemblance to father
considered along with other evidence considered in finding paternity); A.B. v.
C.D., 690 N.E.2d 839 (Mass. App. 1998) (Bald eagle evidence, along with DNA
test results and other facts were considered in determining father's paternity of
child); People v. Horace, 658 N.Y.S.2d 802 (N.Y. 1997) (Although bald eagle
evidence in the form of photographs of the child were generally deemed
inadmissible to prove resemblance to the father, they were admitted, along with
DNA evidence, to show the child's African-American and Caucasian biracial
characteristics in rape case to establish identity of defendant charged with raping
comatose woman); State v. Parham, 636 So.2d 991 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1994);
Miller v. Kirshner, 1990 WL 276614 (Conn. App. 1990); Walker v. State ex rel.
Lyles, 558 So.2d 947 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (Trial court was not required to
exclude bald eagle evidence because other man the defendant claimed was the
father was absent); Lonning v. Leonard, 767 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App. 1988);
Mason v. Reiter, 531 So.2d 348 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1988) (Bald eagle evidence
considered along with HLA test results and father's admission of paternity);
S.A. v. M.A., 531 A.2d 1246 (D.C. 1987) (Must show striking or peculiar non-
resemblance to admit bald eagle evidence); Clark v. Whiten, 508 So.2d 1105,
1109 (Miss. 1987) (Equated to scientific evidence "given what we know about
the genetic passage from father to child of certain physical characteristics, may
be most valuable efforts in the search for truth ... "); State v. Santos, 702 P.2d
1179 (Wash. 1985); State ex rel. Munoz v. Bravo, 678 P.2d 974 (Ariz. App.
1984) (Bald eagle evidence, including photographs of the defendants other
children at about the same age as the child in question, was admissible); State v.
Green, 284 S.E.2d 688 (N.C. App. 1981) (Forehead and side view of child
compared to father); Schigur v. Keck, 286 N.W.2d 917 (Mich. App. 1980)
(Child's hair, hands, jaw, ears and feet compared to father); D.W.L. v. M.J.B.C.,
601 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App. 1980); Tatum v. State, 260 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. App.
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the father - perhaps even walks like the father, then,
congratulations, you are the father. If not, even if the father raised
the child for the past five, ten or even eighteen years, he can avoid
the legal and financial responsibilities of fatherhood and family.
The father was sometimes even able to recover those past
expenditures from the child's biological father.
Bald eagle evidence is the predecessor, and, as this article
argues, the current catalyst and force behind the movement toward
allowing current biology evidence - DNA - to skew the perception
of paternity. Today, the preference for biological parentage,
whether through bald eagle or DNA evidence, assumes biology is
the sole route to paternity.'0 The solution under a biological
privilege paternity system is that when a man has no biological
connection to a child, he is not the child's father, and, more
importantly, should not be burdened with the financial
responsibility of supporting another man's child - the money
connection. 1
1
1979); Dorsey v. English, 390 A.2d 1133 (Md. App. 1978); State v. Clay, 236
S.E.2d 230 (W.Va. 1977); Plourde v. Magee, 552 P.2d 1341 (Or. App. 1976);
Comish v. Smith, 540 P.2d 274 (Idaho 1975); Interest of R.D.S., 514 P.2d 772
(Colo. 1973) (Bald eagle evidence admitted if accompanied by expert
testimony); Glascock v. Anderson, 497 P.2d 727 (N.M. 1972); Hess v. Whitsitt,
65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (App. 2d Dist. 1967); Hassler v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d
827 (D.C. 1956); State ex rel. Fitch v. Powers, 62 N.W.2d 764 (S.D. 1954); Hall
v. Centolanza, 101 A.2d 44 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1953); Roberts v. State, 240
P.2d 104 (Okla. 1952); Feagins v. Conn., 162 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1945); Thomas v.
United States, 121 F.2d 905, 910 (D.C. 1941) (Bald eagle evidence must be "so
striking as to leave no doubt as to its existence."); Lohsen v. Lawson, 174 A.
861 (Vt. 1934); Shannon v. Mace, 1933 WL 1386 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1933);
Narrell v. State, 117 So. 609 (Ala. Civ. App. 1928); Hogan v. State, 282 S.W.
984 (Ark. 1926); State v. Anderson, 224 P. 442 (Utah 1924) (Allowed to testify
about 8-month-old baby's features and show child to the jury); Anderson v.
Aupperle, 95 P. 330 (Or. 1908) (Dismissed claims that a three-month-old child
was too young to display to the jury and that the bald eagle evidence was
vague); Land v. State, 105 S.W. 90, 91 (Ark. 1907) (Held child's age goes to
weight); Shailer v. Bullock, 61 A. 65, 66 (Conn. 1905); State v. Saidell, 46 A.
1083 (N.H. 1900) (Allowed to show racial characteristics to jury to establish
child was Jewish); Gilmanton v. Ham, 1859 WL 3723 (N.H. 1859).
1o See infra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
1i See generally Fairrow v. Fairrow, 599 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1990); K.B. v.
D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725 (Mass. App. 1994); Erwin v. Everard, 561 So.2d 445 (Fla.
App. 5 Dist. 1990). A duty of support is only owed to adoptive or biological
children. See T.P.D. v. A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116, 119 (Alaska 1999); Daniel v.
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This perception of paternity is not usually discovered when
the paternity, custody, visitation or even child support judgment is
entered, but, rather, later, when the father decides, for reasons
ranging from the child's health as in Wise's case to the color of the
child's eyes in another, a "rumor" in yet another, and a child
support wage garnishment order in another, that knowledge of the
child's biological paternity has been beyond his reach, and, once
genetic evidence proves the child is a biological stranger, he wants
this new perception of paternity to set him free - free of child
support obligations, but not necessarily free of custody, visitation
or the other aspects of the father-child relationship. The impetus is
usually one of four things: bald eagle evidence; DNA self-help
testing; money; or a desire to hurt the child's mother. 12
As Mr. Wise put it, "I was still their daddy, and I loved
them as much as the day they were born... but I don't see why I
should be writing checks to a woman who deceived me all those
years."'
3
A biological preference is also where we are headed if
states continue to adopt paternity fraud laws. With the perceived
certainty of DNA evidence in determining paternity and the
uniform acceptance of it as a means of determining biological
parentage,' 4 it is the one thing to which the courts and legislatures
can point in support of their decisions because appearances are
deceptive, people lie and money is the ultimate motivator in
paternity challenges.
Biology is preferenced either through paternity fraud laws,
as in Ohio,' 5 Maryland, 16 Alabama 7 and other states,18 or to some
Daniel, 695 So.2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1997); Swain v. Swain, 567 So.2d 1058 (Fla.
App. 5 Dist. 1990).
12 See Kathy Boccella, Men seek 'paternity fraud' law, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 2002.
13 See supra note 2.
14 Allan S. Livotsky & Kirsten Schultz, Note, Scientific Evidence of Paternity: A
Survey of State Statutes, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 83 (Fall 1998) (stating that by
1998, "every state and the District of Columbia had statutes governing the
admissibility of scientific paternity tests.").
'5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (2003).
16 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 (1995)
17 ALA. CODE § 26-17A-l(a) (1994).
1s ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45n7-8 (1998) (allowing
a challenge to paternity at any time within two years after the father has
2003]
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extent, through statutes that allow the marital presumption to be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence in the form of genetic
testing excluding the established father as the child's biological
parent. 19 This biology preference irreparably harms families long
after the parent-child bonds have formed. Long after the lure of
playing house dissipates, parentage is determined and child support
is ordered, a father can abort the parent-child relationship if he
lives in a state that adheres to an absolute biological preference.
The ability to abort the parent-child relationship, financially and
emotionally, destroys the family and parent-child relationship
based on a mistaken belief that children, like fathers, legislatures
and the courts, define family and fatherhood on the basis of a
genetic truth. In reality, children do not understand biology; they
understand love.
In this article, I will address the role a preference for
biology plays in destroying families under paternity fraud
legislation by addressing the impact that Bald Eagle, and now,
DNA evidence plays in paternity decisions and legislation. To do
so, I will examine the unspoken, but inferential connection
between the marital presumption, bald eagle evidence, DNA
knowledge of facts that suggest he may not be the child's biological parent);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2)(1995); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
45/7 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
54 (2002); IOWA CODE § 600B.41A(3) (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166
(2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (2001).
19 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 1564 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
522:5 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE §26.26.600(1) (2002). See also, ALA. CODE §
26-17-5(b) (1975) cited in Gann v. Gann, 705 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997); Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1996). Some courts allowed
the husband to challenge the marital presumption at the time of the divorce or
related proceedings. See Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E. 1131 (111. App. Ct. 1998);
Marriage of A.J.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Paternity of
B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Cooper v. Cooper, 608 N.E.2d
1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing a father to deny paternity of a seven-year-
old child at the time of divorce); Erwin v. Everard, 561 So.2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); J.N.H. v. N.T.H., 705 So.2d 448 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); K.B. v.
D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (applying policy equating the lack
of a husband's duty to support a wife's extramarital child to the lack of a wife's
duty to support a husband's extramarital child); Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546
(Md. 1986) (upholding the paternity challenge even where the husband knew the
child was not his biological offspring); Purvis v. State of Fl., 377 So.2d 674
(Fla. 1979); R.N. v. J.M., 61 S.W.3d 149 (Ark. 2001); Russell v. Russell, 682
N.E.2d 513 (Ind. 1997); T.P.D. v. A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1999).
[Vol. 7
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
THE DAY THE FAMILY DIES
evidence, and money as the underlying catalyst to paternity
decisions. In Part I of this article, I will present and describe the
biological privilege through paternity fraud laws, other biological
privilege laws and biology trump laws that rebut the marital
presumption as evidence of where we are headed - toward a
biology privilege that trumps all other avenues of paternity. Part II
reviews where we have been - from biology in theory in the
marital presumption and admission of bald eagle evidence to
biology in scientific certainty through blood, HLA and DNA
testing, and finally biology as a sociobiological construct that
promulgated the policies and evolution towards a biological-
privileged society.
Part III explores a number of flawed assumptions judges
and legislators make in pursuing the preference for biology: 1)
that the family dies at divorce, making the marital presumption
moot; 2) that genetic certainty promotes paternity certainty; 3) that
biology is the basis for establishing financial responsibility for
children; and 4) that the search for the truth in biology, in addition
to establishing the truth in paternity, benefits the child and family.
In attempting to define the connection between biology, society
and paternity, I will examine the extension of bald eagle evidence
to the reliance on DNA evidence as a way of looking from the
outer to inner child in disestablishing paternal responsibility.
Likewise, this article addresses the flawed premise in paternity
determinations that creates a financial reward for denying
paternity, ordering genetic testing before determining the
admissibility of test results; replacing an established father with a
biologically-related stranger; and giving preference to men to
punish women who allegedly misrepresent, either directly or by
omission, the paternity of the child over the child's interests.
Finally, in Part IV, I propose a paternity fraud statute that
focuses on the child and the family as they exist in America today
rather than on the white picket fence fiction or fantasy that existed
when the marital presumption was originally adopted. Under the
proposed statute, a child's mother and father would not be entitled
to obtain information through genetic testing that would give rise
to questions concerning the child's biological paternity. For this
statute to work, a non-rebuttable preference in favor of the existing
father-child relationships is proposed as the starting point for all
paternity challenges or filiation claims. Biological truth is
20031
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substituted with the truth children understand - the relationship
with their parents.
Only in the absence of a relationship would biology prevail.
Paternity decisions will be determined based first on family, then
on biology. There would be few prospective post-judgment
challenges to paternity because, under the statute proposed in this
article, they will be unnecessary. In addition, to avoid back-alley
genetic testing, criminal legislation is proposed, making it illegal to
perform genetic testing for purposes of determining the inclusion
or exclusion of parentage without a court order. Under this statute,
a father can be a father without doubts and a child can be certain
that his father is his father, regardless of whether he is the spitting
image of dad.
This discussion, therefore, is limited to biology and
paternity fraud laws in the context of traditional and non-
traditional families, not in circumstances where there is no
relationship between the father and child. In addition, it is limited
to the parental rights, not those of the child. The child would still
have the right to seek a determination of his genetic lineage at the
age of majority or under court order in the case of a medical
emergency requiring the child's genetic history.
I. WHERE WE ARE HEADED - EXISTING LAWS
DEMONSTRATE A BIOLOGICAL PRIVILEGE
If paternity fraud legislation is deemed cutting edge law,
several states are where the rest of the country is headed by
enacting some form of biological privilege or paternity fraud laws
that purport to protect men from the financial burden of caring for
another man's child.2°
There are three main types of biological privilege laws: 1)
absolute privilege or paternity fraud laws, allowing the father to
challenge paternity at any time during the child's minority; 2)
common law biology-privilege laws, allowing paternity challenges
20 See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) (1995); OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, §§ 504B, 505 (2002). See also supra note 18; William C. Smith, Fathers
Charge Legal Bias Toward Moms Hamstrings Them as Full-Time Parents, 89
ABA J. 38, 43 (2003) (identifying Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, Texas and Virginia as states with some form of
current paternity laws).
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based on post-judgment relief rules when there is newly discovered
evidence or fraudulent concealment and the equities of the case
merit relief; and 3) biology trump laws where, at the time of
divorce, a father may challenge the child's paternity, in an attempt
to alleviate himself of the obligation to financially support the
child.
All three of these exist today in some form or another. If
paternity fraud proponents succeed, the absolute privilege will
exist across the country, eliminating states with no biology
privilege and heightening the privilege in those states with partial
or absolute biology trump laws. Even if they fail, each of these
options has the effect of destroying the family by allowing the
father to choose not to be a father anymore based on anger and hurt
stemming from the relationship with the child's mother, forever
damaging the relationship with the child, merely because of his
genes.
True paternity fraud laws allow the father to disclaim
paternity at any time after the child is born based on genetic test
results. They do not consider the social or functioning relationship
between the father and the child. The main thread of these laws is
that biology, or, in paternity challenges, the lack thereof, alleviates
the father from his financial obligations, even where he raised the
child in his home, acknowledged paternity, and, as far as the child
is concerned, is his father.
While some states do not allow the father unlimited time to
challenge paternity, they do allow him to disclaim paternity at the
time of divorce or within a certain period of time after having
acknowledged paternity and "played" dad. Those laws appear
more palatable at first glance because they seem to place limits on
challenges to paternity. In practice, however, they can have the
same effect if a father of two, four, or even ten years is allowed to
deny paternity at the time of divorce or when the child's mother
seeks a child support order.
Because of the social outrage created by paternity fraud
celebrities such as Morgan Wise, Gerald Miscovitch, Dennis
Caron, and Carnell Smith,2' paternity fraud legislation is an
21 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 219, 227. See also The New
Paternity, DNA adds twist to definition of 'Dad', S. F. CHRON., June 17, 2001, at
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inevitable part of America's future and the end of the family as we
know it if the courts and legislatures allow it to persist over the
parent-child relationship.
A. Absolute Biology - Paternity Fraud Laws Prefer
Biology Over Existing Parent- Child Relationships
While paternity fraud laws are recognized in at least nine
22states, statutes in other states often operate in a similar, but more
limited manner, allowing paternity challenges when the father was
unaware of the lack of a biological connection to the child at the
time paternity was adjudicated or acknowledged.23
Paternity fraud laws privilege biological paternity over all
other forms of fatherhood, allowing a paternity challenge based on
genetic evidence long after the father's legal status is established.24
A typical paternity fraud law allows a father to challenge paternity
within a reasonable time after he learns that he may not be the
child's biological father,2 5 relieving the father of the rights and
responsibilities of fatherhood upon proof of genetic test results
excluding him as the biological parent. 26 In addition to relief from
child support, visitation, and custody obligations, the father's name
is also removed from the child's birth certificate. 27 Illinois is a
typical biological-privilege statute, stating, in part:
A-4 (indicating that Carnell Smith created Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, as
well as a national network that works to obtain legislative changes in the law).
22 See Battle Robinson & Susan Paikin, Who is Daddy? A Case for the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000), 19 DEL. LAW. 23, 24, fn.5 (2001) (identifying Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, and Virginia as
states with some form of paternity fraud law, however whose "statutes vary
3reatly in standards, scope and application.").
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57 (2002).
24 See ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (2002); ALA. CODE § 26-17A-l(a) (1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/7 (1998); IOWA
CODE § 600B.41A(3) (2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2)
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2002); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3119.962
(2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (2001).
75 See supra, note 24.
26 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/7 (1998).
27 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001).
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An action to declare the non-existence of the parent
and child relationship may be brought subsequent to
an adjudication of paternity in any judgment by the
man adjudicated to be the father... if, as a result of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests, it is discovered
that the man ... is not the natural father of the
child.., the adjudication of paternity and any orders
regarding custody, visitation, and future payments
28of support may be vacated. 2
Another provision of the Illinois paternity fraud statute sets
forth the time limitation for making a post-judgment paternity
challenge: "an action to declare the non-existence of the parent and
child relationship ... shall be barred if brought...more than 2 years
after the petitioner obtains actual knowledge of relevant facts....29
While there are similarities between the various paternity
fraud laws, they differ in many aspects. For example, while
several statutes allow a father to challenge paternity at any time
during the child's minority,30 others require the father to challenge
paternity within two years after he has reason to believe he is not
the child's biological parent.
31
In addition, some states require the father to obtain genetic
tests excluding him as the child's biological father prior to
petitioning to set aside the paternity determination, while others
allow the father to request testing at the time of the challenge.
32
28 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (1998).
29 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(4) (1998).
30 ALA. CODE § 26-17A-I(a) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (1995); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962
(2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (2001). See also Riccardi, supra note 3;
Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 227.
31 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/8(4) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57
(2002). See also ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166(b) (2002) (applying a three year
statute of limitations).
32 See ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1(a) (1994); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/7(b-5)
(1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
49.10(2001). See also R.L.T. v. S.V.P., 703 So.2d 1002, 1003-1004 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997); Poskarbiewicz v. Poskarbiewicz, 2002 WL 445058 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002), on appeal from remand, 152 Ohio App.3d 307, 787 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) (finding Ohio's paternity fraud law to be an unlawful violation of
the separation of powers provisions in Ohio's constitution). Subsequent cases
have disagreed with the court's analysis on the separation of powers issue. See
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While many of the paternity fraud statutes create an exception to
the ability to challenge an existing paternity determination when
the father acknowledged paternity after knowing he lacked a
biological parental relationship with the child,33 three states do not
limit such contests regardless of the father's knowledge.34
Another form of biological-privilege laws allows a father to
challenge paternity within a set period of time after the child is
born.35  For example, the Wyoming and Colorado biological-
privilege statutes allow a father to deny paternity within a
reasonable time after discovering that he may not be the child's
biological father, however, the challenge must be made before the
child reaches the age of five.36 While more limited in scope, these
laws have the same impact as paternity fraud laws in allowing the
father to abandon the child and family after a relationship has
already been established.
The policy underlying biological-privilege-based laws is
rooted in the common law, where the courts sought to protect the
father tricked by the child's mother from having to support a child
who was biologically unrelated to him. 37 Favoring a biological
truth, one court stated:
While it is the policy of this state to require fathers
to support their minor children, it is not the policy
to extort such support from persons who are not in
fact fathers.
38
Garst v. Hopkins, 2003 WL 1571704 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1792 (1993).
33 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
1038(a)(2)(i) (1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (2003); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-49.10 (2001).
34 See ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1(a) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/7 (1998). See also IOWA CODE § 600B.41A(3)
(2000).
35 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1)(b) (2000); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
160.607(a)(2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-603 (a)(i)(iii) (2002).
36 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1)(b) (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-807
(a) (2002). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(1)(b) cited in K.B. v. G.M.,
490 N.W.2d 715, 717 (N.D. 1992).
37 See Smith v. Dep't of Human Res., 487 S.E.2d 94 (1997).
38 Id. at 96.
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The biological privilege is bolstered when a biological father is
capable of supporting the child or the child is already receiving
welfare as the courts see the child's financial needs as a primary
purpose of paternity determinations. 39 In pursuit of the biological
privilege, the father is characterized as a victim who should not be
punished for his willingness to assume responsibility for a child he
erroneously believes is his biological offspring.4 °
For example, after learning that his former girlfriend slept
with other men while they were cohabitating, the father in Smith
sought to set aside a consent paternity order adjudicating him the
father of two children born while the couple cohabitated.4 1
Because the case was brought before Georgia had enacted
paternity fraud laws, when genetic tests proved he was biologically
unrelated to one of the children, he petitioned to set aside the
paternity order based on his girlfriend's fraudulent concealment of
the child's biological paternity.42 The court reasoned that where
the father had no reason to doubt the child's biological heritage or
the mother's loyalty, admitting paternity would be reasonable and
admirable, and the father should not be punished for not seeking
genetic testing when the child was born. The Georgia appellate
court addressed the impact a demand for genetic testing could have
on an existing family and parent-child relationship, stating:
A contrary rule would invite suspicion and distrust
and essentially require all purported fathers, upon
divorce or separation, to accuse their spouses or
partners of infidelity by demanding proof of
paternity. In addition to fostering animosity
between the parties,... [the challenge] could also
have a negative impact on the father-child
relationship.44
39 id.
40 id.
41 Id. at 95.
42 id.
43 Id. at 96.
44id.
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When an Alabama court addressed the policy behind the
state's paternity fraud statute, it pursued the same logic as the
Smith court, reasoning that a father should not be punished for not
challenging paternity before he had reason to believe he might not
be biologically related to the child.45
The same policies applied in the Smith and S. W.M. cases
are reflected in the paternity fraud statutes' language that does not
require a father to challenge paternity until he actually discovers or
has reason to know he is not the child's biological father.
46
Similarly, the policy that a man should not be required to support
another man's biological child is reflected in paternity fraud laws
that mandate extinguishing all rights and obligations associated
with the status afforded legal fathers upon a demonstration that
there is no biological relationship between the father and child.47
However, consistent with the notion that a father should not be
punished for his ignorance, paternity fraud laws may prevent a
father from setting aside a paternity determination when the father
knew he lacked a biological relationship with the child at the time
of the original paternity determination.
While paternity fraud laws focus on the mother's and
father's conduct and expectations, they do not afford similar
protections of the child's interests. The negative impact on the
father-child relationship which the Smith court sought to avoid is
the inevitable result when paternity fraud laws and biology are
prioritized over the child's interest.
41 See S.W.M. v. D.W.M., 723 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
46 See ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1(a) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (2002);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2002); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 45/7 (1998); IOWA CODE § 600B.41A(3)(2000); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) (1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3119.962
(2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (2001).
47 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/7 (1998).
48 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
1038(a)(2)(i)(1995); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (2003); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-49.10 (2001).
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B. Common Law Biological Privilege - Fraud and
Equity Policies Favor Biological Relationships
Over Social Ones
Some courts favoring a biological-privilege allow fathers to
set aside paternity judgments in the absence of paternity fraud
statutes based on the mother's fraudulent concealment of the
child's paternity.49  The reasoning behind such decisions is
essentially the same as in the case of the underlying paternity fraud
statutes. Equity rules allowing a party relief from a judgment as
inequitable are also available to the courts as an avenue for setting
aside paternity judgments. 50 For example, under Michigan Court
Rule 2.612(C)(1)(e), the court may grant relief from a final
judgment where "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application."
51
Under a fraudulent concealment approach, the court is not
limited by the rules of court for opening final judgments, and can
apply general fraud principles to the paternity context. 52  For
example, in Libro, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed a father to
set aside a nine-year-old paternity judgment even though the father
confirmed through blood tests that he was excluded as the child's
biological father five years earlier.53  There, the father
acknowledged paternity when the parents divorced, then, a year
later, pursued blood testing to ascertain paternity. 54 Although the
blood tests excluded Libro as the child's biological father, he
waited to contest paternity until his former wife moved to reduce
his child support arrearages to judgment. 55 In the absence of a
paternity fraud statute, the father raised paternity as a defense to
49 See Libro v. Walls, 746 P.2d 632, 633 (Nev. 1987); Marriage of M.E., 622
N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (setting aside the paternity determination based
on the mother's extrinsic fraud under T.R. 60(B)(8));
50 White v. Armstrong, 1999 WL 33085 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (applying TENN.
R. Civ. P. 60 to a judgment deemed no longer equitable); Department of Social
Services v. Franzel, 516 N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (setting aside a
support order as no longer equitable under MICH. CT. R. § 2.612(C)(1)(e)). See
also Williams v. Williams, 843 So.2d 720 (Miss. 2003).
5' See MICH. CT. R. § 2.612(C)(1)(e). See also Franzel, 516 N.W.2d at 496.
52 See Libro, 746 P.2d at 633.
53 746 P.2d at 633.
54 Id. at 633.
55 Id.
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56
the motion. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the former
wife's concealment of the child's biological parentage constituted
extrinsic fraud,57 and that she had a duty to tell her husband he
might not be the child's biological father, stating:
Where the fraud is so successful the other party is
not even aware he has a claim or defense, it may be
said he had no reasonable opportunity to present
it.
58
Depicting the father as a victim "lulled by ignorance of the
true facts," the Court reasoned that the mother's silence justified
equitable relief of setting aside the earlier judgment.59
Similarly, the DeRico v. Wilson60 court found that a father
could contest paternity two years after a final paternity
determination, reasoning that the former wife fraudulently
concealed the identity of the biological father of two of the
couple's three children.6 1  The court remanded the case to
determine the amount of reimbursement the father should receive
for child support paid since the date the father challenged
paternity.62  The dissent relied on the father's shared parental
responsibility and two-year delay in seeking to modify the
paternity determination, as well as the former wife's uncertainty as
to the biological paternity of the children, in arguing that there was
no fraud justifying relief from the paternity determination.
63
In applying a biological privilege without specific paternity
fraud provisions, the courts created common law paternity fraud
law. As such, even when there is no specific paternity fraud statute
enacted, the courts can use relief from judgment rules and
fraudulent concealment theories to achieve the same result.
56 id.
57 id.
51 Id. at 634.
" Id. at 633.
60 714 So.2d 623 (Fla. 5 Dist. App. 1998).
61 id. at 624.
62 id.
63 Id. at 625.
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C. Biology Trump Laws - When Biology Prevails Over
the Marital Presumption
Biology trump laws, laws that allow a father to challenge
paternity and the legal presumption of legitimacy64 at the time of
divorce, are the most common type of biological-privilege laws.
These laws acknowledge the presumption of legitimacy, but then
allow the father to rebut the presumption based on genetic test
results that exclude him as the child's biological father.65 He can
also establish that someone else is the biological father.66  The
New Hampshire statute is an example of an exclusionary law,
providing that:
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born
during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that
the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by
the evidence based upon the tests, show that the
husband is not the father of the child.67
While New Hampshire and several other states only allow
the father to rebut the presumption of legitimacy by admitting
genetic test results that exclude him as the child's father,68 the
Uniform Parentage Act of 2002 ("UPA") allows the father to rebut
paternity by either excluding himself or including another
64 See N.H. Rev. Stat. § 522:5 (2003); Okla. Stat. Tit. 10 §§ 504B, 505 (2002);
23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5104(g) (1997); 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5104
(2002). See also Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity
Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 79-80 (2000) (contrasting a state law
approach permitting biological challenge as a complete defense with one in
which biological evidence is a factor to be weighed against the best interests of
the child).
65 See Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-6.1-9(a)(4); 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5104
(2002). Hon. Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a
Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a
Child Born Into a Marriage While That Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 IND. L.
REv. 467,469 (1997).66 id.
67 N.H. Rev. Stat. § 522:5 (2003).
68 Okla. Stat. Tit. 10 §§ 504B, 505 (2002); 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5104(g)
(1997).
2003]
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol7/iss1/4
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
individual as the child's biological father.69 Fathers seeking to
deny paternity under either exclusive or combination exclusive-
inclusive laws will likely use the exclusion option to rebut
paternity as it does not require involving another, possibly
unwilling, individual, the reputed father, in the genetic testing
process. A father can perform the test when he has custody or
visitation of the child, and he does not have to tell the child the
nature of the tests since a DNA test can be performed by taking a
swab sample on the inside of the child's mouth.7°
Other legitimacy presumption laws allow a father to rebut
the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, 71 leaving open
the possibility that a court could interpret that language to include
proof that the father is not biologically related to the child. Given
that paternity challenges by the former husband are "the most
common challenge to paternity at the time of family dissolution,"
there are going to be more instances where the child is left with no
father than those like Stitham v. Henderson,72 where two fathers
asserted rights to the child.73 In addition, the ability to challenge
paternity at the time of divorce can be used as a weapon to deny
the father custody, visitation and decision-making rights over his
children when the mother wants to eliminate his involvement in
her life by removing him from the child's life.
74
When the Stitham court decided the issue of paternity
between the presumed marital father and the mother's new
husband, Stitham, who was also the child's biological father, it
applied Maine's exclusionary law, which makes the marital
presumption inapplicable when genetic test results exclude the
marital father as the biological parent.75 In that case, the former
69 Uniform Parentage Act § 631 (2002). See also Wash. Rev. Code §
26.26.600(1).
70 A swab DNA test is performed by wiping a sterile swab on the inside of the
child's mouth and placing it in a container provided by the testing company.
See swabtest.com.
71 See Ala. Code § 26-17-5(b)(1994); N.J. Stat. §9:17-43(b) (1998); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 126.051(1)2 (1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-17-04(2)(1995); Ohio Rev.
Code ANN. § 3111.03(B)(2003); 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5102(b)3 (2002).
72 768 A.2d 598 (Me. 2001).
73 See Theresa Glennon, Expendable Children: Defining Belonging in a Broken
World, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 269, 271 (2001).74 ld. at 271.
7' 768 A.2d at 602, citing 19-A Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1564(1)(A) (1998).
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husband, Henderson, challenged the biological father's paternity
claim and fought to maintain his parental relationship with his five-
year-old daughter.76 Even though the child's mother and the
biological father married just a few months after the divorce
judgment was entered, the court refused to accord the divorce
judgment res judicata effect over the biological father.77 The court
reasoned that his interests were not protected by the child's mother
because she may not have wanted him involved in the child's life
or he may have been less financially able to support the child.78
The only time the court considered the child's interests was
in addressing Henderson's counterclaim for equitable parental
rights based on the father-child relationship with the child.79
Deferring to the lower court's continuing jurisdiction over the
divorce judgment, the Maine Supreme Court acknowledged the
"undisputed facts" supporting the existing parent-child relationship
and "hoped" that the parties would consider the child's interests in
coming to an agreement regarding Henderson's role in her life
given the loss of his legal status as her father.
80
In the concurring opinion, the biological privilege was
credited with creating accuracy that allows the marital presumption
to "be swept aside by a simple test." 81 Recognizing the conflict
between the marital and biological presumptions, Judge Saufley
wrote:
Although DNA testing may provide a bright line for
determining the biological relationship between a
man and a child, it does not and cannot define the
human relationship between father and child .... 
82
Also deferring to the lower court's discretion, Judge
Saufley made an even stronger plea for the preservation of the
parent-child relationship between Henderson and his daughter,
76 Id. at 600.
77 Id. at 601.
78 Id. The court also indicated that the mother may not have wanted to
"complicate" the divorce by challenging paternity at that time.
79 Id. at 603. The counterclaim was dismissed as a matter properly before the
lower court in the context of the divorce
so Id.
81 Id. at 605.
82 id.
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indicating that "the courts have a responsibility" to maintain the
child's relationship with the defacto parent.
While the Stitham court's reasoning seemed balanced
between the two fathers' interests in the child, neither the majority
nor concurring opinions did more than encourage the lower court
or parties to consider the child's interests. Rather than allowing
the "factually involved father," Henderson, to be swept aside by
biology with a hint of a possibility that he might get a minimal
right to preserve a non-paternal relationship with his daughter, the
court should have upheld the father-child relationship. The fact
that the biological father married the child's mother gives him the
same rights of any stepparent, which is what he is given
Henderson's established role as her father. While acknowledging a
relationship between Henderson and the child, the court failed to
recognize the family that existed even after the divorce and
mother's remarriage. Instead, it asked the people who were
fighting over a child to put aside the last five years of hostility and
allow Henderson to be involved in the child's life.
Without defining the terms of that involvement, it is
unlikely that the biological newlyweds will want the perceived
intrusion of a man they consider an outsider to the family. For
instance, the biological father may see Henderson as an
impediment to his ability to develop a father-child or parental
relationship with the child, and the mother may desire to make a
clean break from her former husband. Likewise, the lower court
may decide that the now eight-year-old child may benefit more
from a single traditional family unit than a blended family, given
the current marital status of the biological parents. Either way, the
biology trump law ended the existing family in favor of a
biological one.
II. WHERE WE HAVE BEEN: THE BALD EAGLE - DNA
CONNECTION
The preference for biological parentage, whether maternal
83
or paternal, has existed in some form or another since the
beginning of time - possibly since Adam and Eve. If, as the first
83 Maternal paternity is not addressed in this article.
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symbolic parents, when Adam and Eve were evicted from the
Garden of Eden, they forewent a traditional marriage in favor of
monogamous cohabitation, and, in due time, Eve gave birth to two
sons, Cain and Abel. If it turned out that when the boys were
about seven and nine, Cain bore no physical resemblance to Adam
while Abel was the spitting image of dad down to the color of his
eyes.
Then, Eve might later decide her relationship with Adam
was less than fulfilling and file a paternity, custody and child
support action against him. Although Adam might accept the
decision and agree to child support in the form of two sheep per
month at first, under current biological-privilege laws, and
common law decisions as early as the late 1940s, Adam would
not be bound by that determination if he could disestablish
biological paternity.
Later, when Cain is fourteen, after having spent every other
weekend and two days a week at Adam's place, Adam, in an effort
to lower his child support obligation, might be inclined to take a
harder look at Cain. Maybe his new girlfriend or a friend points
out that Cain really does not resemble Adam. A rumor starts.
Adam sees an Internet site about paternity fraud. If he was not
suspicious before, he is now. It might dawn on Adam that he
really was not at home that much 14 years and 9 months ago,
having been visiting with God or tending the sheep.
Assuming current paternity fraud or other biological
privileges are in place, Adam could challenge the paternity of Cain
while acknowledging the paternity of Abel since parentage, even
with the marital presumption, which also applies to cohabiters, is
based on a preference for biology over the family and father-child
relationship. In fact, as early as the 1600s, Adam could refute
Cain's paternity with biological evidence to the contrary.
As such, Adam might first offer a defense allowed under
Lord Mansfield's rule that he was extra quartuor maria,85 beyond
the four seas for beyond nine months; in this case, visiting God or
tending his sheep. Sterility, another biological-based and equally
acceptable defense to paternity, is an unlikely option if Adam
84 See Vorvilas v. Vorvilas, 31 N.W.2d 586 (Wis. 1948).
85 See Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The
Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REv. 523, 528 (2000).
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acknowledges his paternity over Abel. However, impotence,
which can be either psychological or physical, would be admissible
biological proof to refute Adam's paternity over Cain.
He might go one step further and offer what has been
identified as bald eagle evidence. Simply put, Adam may argue
that Cain bears no physical resemblance to Adam, and, therefore,
could not be his biological child.
As science advances, Adam might be able to exclude
himself as a possible father of Cain through blood groupings that
show his blood type is A+, Eve's is B and Cain's is 0, which
creates a biological impossibility regarding Adam's potential
paternity of Cain. If that is not enough, Adam can offer Human
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood test results that may be able to
exclude him as Cain's biological father with over ninety-nine
percent accuracy.
86
Then Adam can point the finger - it must be the devil's
child. Adam can even testify that he saw Eve consorting with the
devil under the old apple tree in the Garden of Eden. Lucifer
himself can testify that it is possible he is the father, especially if
Lucifer wants to develop a relationship with Cain.
Adam now wants a DNA test. He can request that he,
along with Eve, Cain and Lucifer, be tested to determine Cain's
"true biological" parentage. If he cannot wait for the court to
approve his request for genetic testing and wants to bolster his
paternity contest, he can enlist self-help testing. He can order a
swab test off the internet, swab the inside of his and Cain's mouths
and send in the swabs to a testing lab that will tell him the
possibility of a genetic connection between himself and Cain.
If the test excludes Adam as Cain's biological father, it
conclusively decides the issue in favor of Adam, relieving him of
further financial and emotional responsibility as Cain's father. If it
includes him by less than 98 or 99 percent, depending on the state
where the family resides, the evidence is admissible, and is usually
weighed with all the evidence in favor of and against paternity.
Only when the DNA evidence includes Adam by more than 99
percent in most states will Adam be presumed to be Cain's
biological father. Even then, Adam may doubt his biological
86 Mark E. Sullivan, Proving Paternity By Presumption and Preclusion, 132
MIL. L. REv. 99, 99-100 (1991).
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connection with Cain since his paternity cannot be determined with
100 percent biological certainty.
Essentially, that is how paternity has evolved over the past
nine centuries, with biology at the core of the determination.
A. Biology as a Legal Precept - Paternity Laws' Roots
Are in Biology
The connection of biology and paternity laws can be seen
in the evolution of paternity laws from looking at the external
physical resemblance of the child and father when science could do
no more to assure the father that the child was biologically-related
to him, to looking at the internal resemblance between the father
and child by blood, HLA and DNA testing. Evidence in support of
or opposition to paternity challenges has always revolved around
discovering the biological parent-child relationship.
1. Bald Eagle Evidence - DNA's Biologically-
Based Predecessor
Bald eagle evidence was born out of what people could
easily understand. Before the advent of the Elizabethan Poor Law
of 157687 and the 1953 discovery of the DNA molecule by
scientists James Watson and Francis Crick, 88 there was bald eagle
evidence.
Bald eagle evidence, considering the resemblance or lack
of resemblance between a potential father and child to prove or
disprove paternity, dates back to "the ancient city of Carthage."
89
A council would examine children when they reached the age of
two and determine whether they lived or died based on their
87 Roe v. Roe, 316 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (Identifying Elizabethan
Poor Law as the father of paternity laws, whereby the purpose of the law was to
indemnify the church for the expense of supporting the children).
88 For a comprehensive overview of the history of bald eagle and paternity law,
see E. Donald Shapiro, Stewart Reifler & Claudia L. Psome, The DNA Paternity
Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 29 (1992-93),
citing Douglas Peerage Case, 2 Hargr. Collect. Jurid. 402 (1769).
89 Shapiro, supra note 88 at 16, 17; Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 224-
225.
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physical resemblance to their father. 90 Children who did not
resemble their fathers to the council's satisfaction would be
killed. 9'
This principle carried over to English common law, and,
92eventually, to American common law. In the 1769 Douglas
Peerage case, English Judge, Lord Mansfield, set out the logic
behind considering bald eagle evidence as an aid in determining
parentage in terms of the likelihood of encountering two similar
men in an army.93 Lord Mansfield wrote:
[In] an army of a hundred thousand men every one
may be known from the other. If there should be a
likeness of features, there may be a discriminancy
of voice, a difference in the gesture, the smile, and
various other things; whereas a family-likeness
generally runs through all these; for in everything
there is a resemblance as of features, size, attitude,
and action.. .Among eleven black rabbits, there will
scarce be found one to produce a white one.
94
Although some American courts rejected bald eagle
evidence as unreliable, vague, or as a matter of opinion over fact,
95
90 Shapiro, supra note 88 at 16; Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 224-225.
91 Shapiro, supra note 88 at 16.
92 Id.: See also infra note 72.
93 Shapiro, supra note 88 at 16.
94 Id. at 16, citing Douglas Peerage Case, 2 Hargr. Collect. Jurid. 402 (1769).
95 See Elizabeth H. v. James M., 429 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980);
Theresa J. v. Troy M., 392 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977); Commissioner
of Welfare of City of New York v. Leroy C., 359 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div.
1974) (Holding bald eagle evidence inadmissible as "neither accurate nor
reliable."); State ex rel. Schlehlein v. Duris, 194 N.W.2d 613 (Wis. 1972);
Kaneshiro v. Belisario, 466 P.2d 452 (Haw. 1970); Almeida v. Correa, 465 P.2d
564 (Haw. 1970); Nott v. Bender, 202 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. 1964); People ex rel.
Wedeking v. Enke, 1919 WL 1600 (I11. App. 3 Dist. 1919); Flores v. State, 73
So. 234 (Fla. 1916); Overlock v. Hall, 17 A. 169 (Me. 1889); Clark v.
Bradstreet, 15 A. 56 (Me. 1888); Robnett v. People, 1885 WL 8242 (Ill. App. 4
Dist. 1885); Keniston v. Rowe, 1839 WL 688 (Me. 1839) (Holding evidence of
resemblance inadmissible as a matter of opinion, but distinguishing color of
complexion as a matter of fact properly decided by a jury). See also Shapiro,
supra note 88 at 17, 19 and fn 105 (Noting that courts feared abuse of bald eagle
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the majority of states allowed bald eagle evidence, in some form or
another, as evidence of paternity. 96 As early as 1860, bald eagle
evidence was used to disprove paternity based on a lack of
resemblance between the child and reputed father.97 Other courts
allowed consideration of everything from the child's hair and skin
color,98 to the appearance of the child's hands, feet, and forehead. 99
In allowing the child to be brought into the courtroom for
comparison with the defendant, the Bowles court reasoned that the
appearance of a child could be compared with the appearance of a
purported father because of the "physical and external" differences
between races, and those between families.'0° While some courts
applied this policy indiscriminately, others allowed bald eagle
evidence only where a question of race or "color" was involved,1
0 1
while still others restricted its use to situations where specific
characteristics were so striking as to be determinative.1
0 2
In addition, treatment of bald eagle evidence ranged from
allowing the child to be exhibited to the jury without testimony to
requiring expert testimony to accompany the comparison. 10 3 The
evidence where juries might be persuaded to find resemblances more substantial
in cases where the plaintiff was particularly sympathetic).
96 See supra note 9 and accompanying cases.
97 State v. Bowles, 1860 WL 4725 (N.C. 1860).
98 See State ex rel. Feagins, 162 P.2d at 76-77 (allowing a red-headed child to be
displayed before the jury to disprove paternity where mother and reputed father
both had dark hair and dark complexions).
99 Green, 284 S.E.2d 688 (permitting as evidence the resemblance of the child's
forehead and profile to those of the mother and purported father); Schigur, 286
N.W.2d 917 (permitting as evidence the resemblance of the child's hair, hands,
jaw, ears, and feet to those of the purported father).
1oo See Bowles, supra note 97.
101 Saidell, 46 A. 1083 (permitting as evidence a comparison or "race
characteristics" between child and purported father); Gilmanton, 1859 WL 3723
(permitting consideration of a child's appearance, complexion, and features in a
bastardy proceeding).
102 Thomas, 121 F.2d at 910 (permitting evidence of resemblance only where
"so striking as to leave no doubt as to its existence); Lohsen, 174 A. 861
(admitting evidence of specific physical traits, but not general appearance). See
also S.A., 531 A.2d 1246 (finding striking or peculiar non-resemblance to be
admissible).
103 See Kennedy, 450 N.E.2d at 171-72 (stipulating that expert testimony must
accompany any bald eagle evidence); Interest of R.D.S., 514 P.2d 772 (Colo.
1973) (permitting the introduction of bald eagle evidence if accompanied by
expert testimony). See also Shapiro, supra note 88 at 18.
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age of the child was also taken into consideration in come cases.
Some courts excluded bald eagle evidence for children under an
age deemed to be indicative of "settled" features.1°4 Other courts
indicated that the child's age only went to the weight of the
evidence, allowing children as young as three months to be shown
to the trier of fact for determination of physical resemblances.'
0 5
The admission of bald eagle evidence is still expressly
permitted by statute in South Carolina,1° 6 as well as by common
law in other states.' °7  In addition, the perceived lack of
resemblance between a father and child is often a reason cited for
bringing a paternity challenge. 108 Under this standard, Adam could
introduce his lack of resemblance to Cain as evidence of non-
paternity and as a basis for setting aside both the paternity
adjudication and the child support order.
2. Marital Presumption - Birth of a Family or
Implied Biology
In the sixteenth century, the marital (or legitimacy)
presumption was created under English common law. 0 9 The
doctrine, pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant,' 10 now codified in
'04 See Lohsen, 174 A. 861. See also Shapiro, supra note 88 at 18.
105 Anderson, 95 P. 330 (Dismissing claim that child was too young for
comparison at three months old, holding that the child's age goes to the weight
of the evidence); Land, 105 S.W. at 91 (holding that child's age goes to weight
rather than admissibility of evidence). See also Shapiro, supra note 88 at 18.
'06 See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-956(B) (2002).
'07 See Jeffries, 559 S.E.2d 217; Brown, 526 S.E.2d 686; A.B., 690 N.E.2d 839;
Parham, 636 So.2d 991; Miller, 1990 WL 276614; Department of Revenue v.
Spinale, 550 N.E.2d 871 (Mass. 1990); Walker, 558 So.2d 947.
108 See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
109 See Brie S. Rogers, The Presumption of Paternity in Child Support Cases: A
Triumph of Law Over Biology, 70 U. CN. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (2002); Theresa
Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 562 (2000); Paula Roberts, Biology and
Beyond: The Case for Passage of the New Uniform Parentage Act, 35 FAM. L.Q.
41, 44 (2001); Jill Handley Andersen, The Functioning Father: A Unified
Approach to Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847, 852 (1991/92).
",0 Translated as "the nuptials show who is the father" Edward R. Armstrong,
Family Law - Putative Fathers and the Presumption of Legitimacy - Adams and
the Forbidden Fruit: Clashes Between the Presumption of Legitimacy and the
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most states, creates a presumption that a child born during
marriage or within a specified 280 to 300 day period following the
dissolution of marriage is the biological child of both husband and
wife. 11  The assumption is based in biology; that children
conceived during the period of the marriage would logically be the
biological offspring of the marriage. This presumption was
intended to establish biological certainty at a time when biology
could not be readily ascertained by biological or medical
science. 12 One of the underlying goals of the marital presumption
was to prevent legitimate children born of a marriage from
becoming illegitimate. '13
Exceptions to the marital presumption are also based in
biology. A husband can rebut the marital presumption if he is
impotent or sterile, if he lacked access to his wife for nine
months," s4  if he was imprisoned, or if he is incapable of
procreation due to his age.' I Alternatively, he can rebut paternity
by establishing his wife's infidelity as an adulteress who left him
to live with another man.116  Originally, rebutting the maritalpresumption was difficult because American courts, adopting Lord
Rights of Putative Fathers in Arkansas, 25 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L. REV. 369,
371-2 (2003) note 16.
1 " See Uniform Parentage Act § 204 (2002), supra note 6.
112 "The presumption permitted courts to assume a set of biological facts (and
thus a history of relationships) in order to safeguard a traditional model of
family." Janet L. Dolgin, supra note 85 at 528.
113 See Armstrong, supra note 110 at 372; Rogers, supra note 109 at 1151-1152.
The reasons for preserving legitimacy were threefold: 1) to protect the best
interests of the child insofar as inheritance, social security benefits, life
insurance and other rights of support, established medical history, and cultural
heritage were tied to legitimacy; 2) to protect the family; and 3) to protect the
state from the financial drain of wards of the state. See Chezem & Nagy, supra
note 64 at 468; Roberts, supra note 109 at 53-54; David V. Hadek, Why the
Policy Behind the Irrebuttable Presumption of Paternity Will Never Die, 26 Sw.
U. L. REv. 359, 360 (1997). 'The presumption also served the judicial system
by allowing courts to cut off debates between irate parents about the biological
origins of their children at a time when doubts about a child's genetic origins
were more a matter of suspicion than science." Kaplan, supra note 64 at 71
(2000).
114 Rogers, supra note 109 at 1153-1154; Kaplan, supra note 64 at 70. See also
Glennon, supra note 109 at 565; Dolgin, supra note 85 at 527; Roberts, supra
note 109 at 44.
115 Armstrong, supra note 110 at 372.
116id.
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Mansfield's rule, allowed neither the husband nor the wife to
testify to non-access or otherwise testify as to the child's
illegitimacy. " 
7
By the end of the nineteenth century, Lord Mansfield's rule
began to fade in popularity. By the beginning of the twentieth
century, both spouses were generally allowed to testify as to facts
establishing or disestablishing paternity."S8 This change facilitated
challenges to the presumption."l 9 In the present day, DNA test
results may be used to rebut the marital presumption, although
some states do not permit such rebuttal. 
20
The ability to rebut the presumption with biological
evidence is consistent with the presumption's biological-privileged
premise. It is not, however, consistent with the presumption's
policy of preserving the family; in fact, it does the opposite.
Rebuttal allows an existing father with an established parent-child
relationship to end the relationship and abandon the child during
the child's minority. 12  It also allows third parties to challenge
parentage, even where a traditional family structure is in place. 1
22
Some courts have reasoned that biology trump laws are
consistent with the marital presumption's family protection policy
in cases where there is no family structure to protect. "' Such
reasoning relies on the assumption that only an intact, traditional
family structure is entitled to protection. This assumption ignores
the reality that many families exist where mother and father reside
in different households, but nevertheless, both parent the child.
2 4
In such cases, where rebuttal of the marital presumption is
permitted, the family is destroyed not by marital dissolution, but by
117 Kaplan, supra note 64 at 70; Rogers, supra note 109 at 1153-1154; Glennon,
supra note 109 at 563-564; Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 223; Lynne
Marie Kohm, Marriage and the Intact Family: The Significance of Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 22 WHrTIER L. REV. 327, 335 (2000); Andersen, supra note 109 at
852.
118 Glennon, supra note 109 at 564.
119 Chezem & Nagy, supra note 64 at 468.
120 See Rogers, supra note 109 at 1154. See also supra notes 64-82 and
accompanying text.
121 Glennon, supra note 109 at 566.
122 Id.
127 See Sandra S. v. Larry W., 667 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997);
State v. Thomas, 584 N.W.2d 421,425 (Minn. App. 1998).
124 See infra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
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allowing the father to dissolve his parental and familial
relationships. If Adam were allowed to abandon Cain, he would
destroy not only his paternal relationship with Cain, but also the
family structure he created with Cain, Abel and Eve.
3. DNA - Bald Eagle Evidence for the Inside
"He does not look like me -just look at his genes." Where
bald eagle evidence compares the outer resemblance between
father and child, DNA evidence compares the inner resemblance.
DNA evidence has still not completely replaced bald eagle
evidence, possibly because the two are interrelated: a suspected
lack of external resemblance almost inevitably leads to testing of
internal resemblance.
As early as the 1930s, blood tests were admitted as
exclusionary evidence in paternity proceedings, although they were
not universally accepted at that time. 125 By the end of the 1940s,
however, blood-grouping tests were generally admitted due to their
certainty and reliability.126 Since then, virtually every state has
implemented some sort of statutory acceptance of genetic test
results in paternity cases. 27
Originally, genetic testing was considered to confirm or
deny paternity for children born out of wedlock.128 It was used to
determine whether a putative father owed a child support
obligation. As testing evolved, its use extended from merely
excluding men as potential fathers to confirming suspected
paternity. Therefore, Adam, even with presumptive fatherhood,
could use DNA evidence to disclaim paternity of Cain.
125 See State v. Damm, 266 N.W.667 (S.D. 1936); Flippen v. Meinhold, 282
N.Y.S. 444 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935). See also Commonwealth v. English, 186 A.
298 (Pa. Super. 1936). But see Thomas v. Elliott, 273 N.Y.S. 898 (N.Y. Child
Ct. 1934). See generally Roberts, supra note 109 at 46; Glennon, supra note
109 at 555.
126 See generally, Shapiro, supra note 88 at 19.
127 See Roberts, supra note 109 at 46; Livotsky & Schultz, supra note 14 at 83-
84.
128 DNA testing was originally utilized to prove paternity in welfare recipient
children to recover welfare support costs. See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note
4 at 225.
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4. Paternity Fraud - The Money Connection in
Paternity Decisions
Where men might find personal vindication in proving that
a woman lied in wrongfully accusing him of fatherhood, with the
loom of paternity fraud legislation, monetary damages became a
new motive for paternity challenges. A man can avoid future and
sometimes past child support arrearages by proving he is not
biologically related to a child. DNA testing can conclusively
exclude a man as a child's father, a9 and, in some sense, permits
fathers to avoid child support obligations 130 either at the time of
divorce where genetic test results trump the marital
presumption, 131 or, in pure biological privilege states, at any time
the father decides he no longer wishes to pay child support. 132
As early as 1948, a father challenged paternity and sought
to avoid his child support obligation citing his wife's misconduct
in failing to disclose their child's biological lineage.1 33 The father
in Vorvilas sought to rebut the marital presumption on the basis of
the extraordinary circumstance that he never actually cohabitated
with his wife other than on the night of their wedding. 134 The
child, born approximately six months after the wedding, was
allegedly not his biological offspring.' 35 The trial court determined
that since the wife deceived the husband, and was guilty of fraud in
concealing her pregnancy from her husband, the child was not of
the marriage and no child support was owed.
136
The husband in Vorvilas had no relationship with the child,
and can hardly be considered a member of her family. However,
pure paternity fraud laws allow fathers who played a role in raising
a child for two years or even for the child's entire minority to
challenge paternity and avoid child support. 137  This approach
129 DNA analysis provides a means to distinguish between all individuals, with
the exception of identical twins. Shapiro, supra note 88 at 24, 29.
130 Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 227.
131 See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
133 Vorvilas, 31 N.W.2d 586.
134 Id. at 587.135 id.
136 Id. at 588.
137 See infra notes 361-365 and accompanying text.
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would reward Adam for challenging Cain's paternity without
regard for the father-child relationship or the existing family
structure.
B. Biology as a Sociobiological Norm - Society
Assumes a Biology-Parenting Link
According to sociobiologists, parents inherently nurture
their children in order to propagate their own genetic heritage. 
13
Parents go to great lengths to ensure that their biological lineage
continues, utilizing artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and
surrogacy as means to maintain at least one biological connection
to the child. 139 Even when parents cannot conceive a child, they
often want to adopt children like themselves.
For example, a couple placed ads offering fifty thousand
dollars for the egg from a five-foot, ten-inch tall female with 1400
college entrance scores. 40 When their attorney was interviewed
on CNN, he acknowledged the couple's desire to have tall,
intelligent children like themselves.'14  Recognizing the
implication of his declaration, the attorney added that the couple
would love the child even if it was short and not very smart. 14 2 An
implication of the attorney's statement could be that the couple
will love the child because it will be theirs, at least partially
138 Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4, at 224. See also Dolgin, supra note 85,
at 542; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REv. 2401, 2434 (1995).
139 See Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1778; Marsha Garrison, Law Making for
Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 837, 922 (2000). Artificial insemination
involves spinning the man's sperm and inserting it into the woman's uterus
while in vitro fertilization involves removing eggs from the woman, fertilizing
them with the man's sperm and reinserting them into the woman's uterus. Both
can be accomplished to ensure a shared biology between the man and woman.
Surrogacy can involve the woman's egg and man's sperm as with in vitro
fertilization, but the fertilized egg is placed in a surrogate's uterus. Other
surrogacy options include donated eggs, sperm or both. See generally, Charles
Kindregan & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in
the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VLLR. 169 (2004).
140 Dolgin, supra note 85, at 523.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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biologically related to the couple if the man's sperm is used to
fertilize the egg.1
43
Biology is also deemed to be the impetus for family ties;
the biological relationship prompting the social one. 144 As such,
biology has been described as a:
Magnetic force as a binder of individuals into
communities, the sense of rootedness conferred by a
family tree, the meaning of heritage within religious
traditions, or any of the many manifestations of
genetic connection's positive power.
145
Many sociologists believe that biology is the link between nature
and nurture, creating a desire to ensure the child's safety, well-
being and development. 146  Describing biological offspring as
"little Pictures" of their biological parents, Samuel Pufendorf, a
natural law theorist, maintained that a biological connection with a
child will "motivate parents to act in the interests of their
children."'
' 47
The biological or natural link to the nurture component of
parenting is supported by research that demonstrates that parents
are less likely to commit an act of violence towards their biological
offspring than to other children. 1
48
By this account, parents nurture their young (and
have little inclination to nurture the children of
others) in order to protect their genetic heritage and
maximize its survival.
149
143 See Dolgin, supra note 85, at 523.
144 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4, at 222; Scott & Scott, supra note
139, at 2424, 2434.
145 Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1858.
146 See Katherine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of a Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879, 889 (1984), citing J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 85 (J.W. Gough ed. 1947) (1st ed. London 1690).
147 Id., citing 2 S. PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, ch. 2,
Sec. 4, at 915.
148 See Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2434.
149 id.
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In addition to creating an affinity and "moral obligation" to
one's offspring, 15 biology has also been linked to the family's
creation. 15  As a result, a father's willingness to commit to
marriage was believed to correlate to his willingness to commit to
a child.152 The biological precipice for marriage suggests that the
reason to marry is to create a family, necessitating children.
153
However, because of the perception that marriage is a means to
biological offspring, many men view parenthood as a part of the
marital relationship rather than as an independent relationship with
the child. 154  Sociologists Frank Furstenberg, Jr. and Andrew
Cherlin maintain that because many men view marriage and
parenthood as interrelated, once the marriage ends, so does the
father-child relationship. 1
55
Not all men end their parental relationships when the
marriage dissolves. However, because the parent-child contact is
often less frequent and involves conflict between the parents,' 56 the
non-custodial parent's bond with the child often weakens. 157 This
is evidenced by more selfish conduct by the non-custodial parent
subsequent to the termination of the intimate relationship between
the parents. 1
58
Because of the sociobiological role in parenthood, once
DNA results disestablish biological paternity, it is difficult for a
father to consider the other aspects of fatherhood, including his
affinity for and relationship with the child. 159  In addition, as
biological ties are also linked to the child's identity as evidenced
by the desire of adopted children to seek out and establish
150 Id. at 2444; Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4, at 218, 225.
151 Bartlett, supra note 147, at 888; Dolgin, supra note 85, at 524 (indicating that
family relationships were believed to be based on fixed "biological truths.");
Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1763;
152 Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REv. 585, 627 (1991).
153 See Bartlett, supra note 147, at 888; Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2444.
154 See Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1763.
155 id.
156 Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2447.
157 See Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2443, 2446.
158 Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2446.
159 See Dolgin, supra note 85, at 544; Robinson & Paikin, supra note 22, at 25.
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relationships with their biological parents,' researchers believe
that a child's genes do more than determine the color of the child's
eyes.16 1  A child's "personality and development" are also
attributed to the child's genetic heritage.' 6 2  Therefore, the
biological-privilege approach's reliance on the benefit to the child
in developing a relationship with his biological father, as well as
the injustice in requiring a father to incur financial responsibilities
for a biologically unrelated child, is imbedded in the
sociobiological connection.
HI. A FLAWED BIOLOGICAL PREMISE - THE DAY THE
FAMILY DIES
The policy behind a biological paternal truth is founded on
the principle that if a man is biologically connected to a child, he
will innately desire to care for the child; both financially and
emotionally. 16 3 That happily ever after mentality works well for
fairy tales and movies, but, in the real world where the family does
not always fit into the traditional family model, the courts need to
consider that the biological father's whereabouts may not be
known; he may be dead, unaware of the child, or, aware of the
child but have no desire to be the father.
Proponents of a biological privilege argue that it does not
matter. A child is entitled to know his "real" biological father,
who owes society and the child a duty of financial, if not
emotional, support. 164  Biological privilege proponents further
argue that it is in the child's best interest to know the biological
father. 165  Although there are reasons for knowing a biological
parent, such as health history and identity questions, there are also
160 See Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2444; Woodhouse, supra note 32, at
1778; Roberts, supra note 109, at 41 ("Knowing who their genetic mother and
father are can bring financial and emotional support as well as valuable
information about family medical history.").
161 Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1778.162 id.
163 See supra notes 139-140, 147-148 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. See also Clevenger v.
Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1961); Thomas, 584 N.W.2d at
424-425.
165 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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a whole host of potential disadvantages to both the child and
biological father in this approach.
For example, when the child is the product of an adulterous
affair, thrusting the child into the biological father's life may cause
his family to unravel, leaving the children from that marriage
without a live-in father as well or, alternatively, thrusting the
mother's paramour into the child's family may cause the husband
and only father the child knows to abandon the family. Some of
the more extreme possibilities include the potential that the
biological father may not want the child, or may even neglect,
abandon or harm the child.
When it excludes a father, it takes away the desire to be
part of the child's life, ending the family's functionality. When it
includes another person as a biological father, it can be equally
devastating to an existing family unit, imposing an unwanted
stranger into the family. Likewise, when genetic testing predates
an admissibility determination, it creates a situation the family
must face head on because, like an abortion, it cannot be undone.
This is especially true given the bald eagle, DNA, money
connection. Bald eagle evidence creates suspicion and fuels the
DNA request, which, when tied with the monetary incentive to
avoid the financial obligation of child support, is an incredible lure
to even those who had no doubts about their children's paternity. 166
A biology privilege also encourages a lack of diligence and
perjury, something it purports to discourage in that fathers have an
incentive to fabricate newly discovered evidence or incur a faulty
memory about what they knew when the child was conceived or
born. It also favors men in letting them challenge paternity if they
choose to abandon the parent-child relationship or preserve the
parent-child relationship when they want to maintain that role.
Most of all, it harms families by changing the dynamics of the
father-child relationship.
166 See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
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A. Marriage and Biology - A Biological Preference
Destroys Non-Traditional Families
Although families have changed dramatically since Lord
Mansfield's rule protected marital families, the legal system is
slow. It was only in 1973 that the UPA acknowledged
cohabitation as a form of family. 167  In addition, instead of
acknowledging non-traditional families, the courts and legislatures
have retreated to biology as a safe haven and determined that if a
father lived with the child during the child's first two years and
held the child out to the public as his own, 168 then he is presumed
to be the child's biological father.' 
69
The biology connection in the hold-out provisions,
especially as adopted in the UPA, stem from the assumption that a
man who lives with the child during the infancy of the child would
likely be the biological parent or, alternatively, based on socio-
biological principles, 170 the person most likely to hold out a child
as his own would be the biological father, who for some reason,
has not done the right thing by the child's mother in a traditional
sense of the notion, but who may be trying to make the relationship
work for the sake of the child.
Families, however, have changed from the traditional dual-
parent marital family to a more flexible version of the family.
New models of family include anything from bi-coastal families to
families where the parents have never married or cohabitated but
share equally in the child rearing responsibilities to same-sex
couples who raise the child as a family, with only one parent
biologically related to the child.
167 The Uniform Parentage Act (1973) (UPA) has been amended in 2000 and
2002, but essentially relies on the same biology-based presumption, extending
the biological privilege by limiting the period when a father may live with and
hold out a child as his own without marrying or attempting to marry the child's
mother to the first two years of the child's life. Uniform Parentage Act §
204(a)(5) (2000) (amended 2002).
168 The UPA and state laws use the term own or biological offspring
interchangeably.
169 See Ala. Code § 26-17-5(4) (1994); Cal. Fam. Code § 7611 (d) (2003); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 19-4-105(d) (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.051(i)(d) (1997); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 9:17-43(a)(5) (1998); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-17-04(d) (1995).
170 See supra notes 139-140, 147-148 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, families can be created through love or
money; they can be grounded in biology or
intention; they can include children created through
donated gametes, children with several biological
mothers, children who survived the choices
attendant upon genetic testing at the embryonic
stage, or no children at all. 7 '
When the biology privilege is applied to the non-traditional
family, the family suffers and, at some point, can dissolve.
First, the child, the core of the non-traditional family,
suffers from the loss of the only father or parent, given that the
same principles apply to same-sex families, she knows and from
the uncertainty of her biological heritage. In addition, the child's
siblings suffer, especially if a parent challenges the paternity of
one child but not another. The fact that one child may lose the
connection with the parent while the other maintains visitation,
affection and financial support cannot foster the development of a
healthy relationship between the children or within the family unit,
now split by its genes.
Ironically, while DNA evidence is perceived to create
certainty, it actually fosters doubt. It fosters doubt in the child who
never knows if and when the father will decide to disclaim and
abandon him, leaving him emotionally and financially destitute.
Finally, a pure biology-based system potentially allows a
stranger to thrust his interests on the families, including forcing the
child to engage in parental visitations with a biological father the
child does not know. The child may also lose his father if his
parents separate as a result of the third party's intrusion into the
family dynamics; if biology prevails, the family does not.
1. The Family Defined - What Constitutes a
Parent-Child Relationship
What makes a family is almost as difficult to discern as
what makes a father, which may explain the Supreme Court's
171 Dolgin, supra note 85, at 525.
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desire to hold onto traditional notions of a family. 172 At the same
time, however, non-traditional families are becoming, if they are
not already, commonplace.173 The perception that a family can
only be defined by the father's relationship to the child's mother
74
assumes that families are born of the sociobiological premise that a
parent's feelings for each other rather than for the child create a
family.
175
While a two-parent family is also beneficial to the child as
evidenced by the financial, academic and societal problems
sociologists have attributed to single-parent families, the
assumption that the lack of a traditional family causes these
problems is flawed. 176 Rather, these societal problems arise when
a father, whether married to the child's mother or living separate
and apart from the child's inception, fails to provide the child with
emotional or financial support - putting an end to the family.
177
When that happens, biological-privilege proponents are right: the
family is already dead and the child will suffer the effects of that
loss. 178 That is not, however, something the law should condone.
To do so would be to encourage lawyers to counsel fathers to walk
away from their children if they want to challenge paternity as a
strategic move to strengthen their claim that no family exists.
When a parent maintains a relationship with the child
despite the end of the intimate relationship with the child's mother,
the family remains intact, albeit in a different structure than while
the parents were married or cohabitating.18  Arguably, once the
172 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91
(1989).
173 About a third of all children born in the United States are not born into a
traditional family unit. See Garrison, supra note 141, at 887; Woodhouse, supra
note 32, at 1762. See also Kisthardt, supra note 153, at 641.
174 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110.
175 See Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1761. See also supra notes 139-163 and
accompanying text.
176 See Woodhouse, supra note 32, at 1762,
177 Id. at 1763.
178 See Bartlett, supra note 147, at 909-9 10.
179 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4, at 220.
180 See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV.
423, 464 (Feb, 1983), citing J. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup:
Children and Parents Cope With Divorce 219 (1980). Even a bad relationship
with the non-custodial parent is preferred to complete abandonment. Id. at 464-
465.
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geography of the family changes - the child no longer living with
both parents - the family changes.' 81
That does not mean the family no longer exits. It exists in
the time spent with the child during visitation or joint custody, the
father's role in decisions affecting the welfare of the child, and the
father's financial and emotional support for the child, as well as the
overall relationship between the father and child. That father-child
relationship is not dependant on where the child lives or the
specific household functions the parent performs. 182  As one
scholar stated:
Parents are not fungible child rearers. The link
between parent and child has substantial and
intrinsic value to the child; the substitution of
another parent and/or termination of the relationship
is accomplished only at considerable cost to the
child. 1
83
Once that relationship is established, the parent-child
relationship cannot be destroyed by divorce alone.' 84 Children do
not view their families in the limited construct of the white picket
fence fiction, especially when many of them never lived the
fantasy. 185
When a biological privilege allows the father to know the
genetic heritage of the child, however, it discounts the father's role
in the family,186 as well as the child's need to belong to a family.'
87
Proponents of a pure biological privilege may argue that once the
relationship is compromised by the biological truth, the courts
cannot force the father and child to maintain a loving, caring
relationship. 88 While this is true, that does not mean the legal
181 See Rogers, supra note 109, at 1172; Roberts, supra note 109, at 56.
182 Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2402.
183 Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 2415.
'm Glennon, supra note 72, at 278.
185 See Garrison, supra note 140, at 887; Woodhouse, supra note 32, at1762.
See also Kisthardt, supra note 153, at 641.
186 See Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood,
1996 UTAH L. REv. 461, 485 (1996).
187 See Bartlett, supra note 147, at 903-905.
188 See Rogers, supra note 109, at 1172-1173.
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system should encourage fathers to abandon their fatherly
relationships when the intimate relationship with the child's
mother ends. 189 To do so offers a monetary reward for sacrificing
the parent-child relationship. 90 Because a biological parent has
the same duty to support the child when he does not live with the
child as when he does, it should not matter where the non-
biological father lives when he has a parent-child relationship with
the child. Consistency requires that if geography is not a criteria
for parenthood when there is no established father in the child's
life, it should be even less important when there is.
A more practical approach is to acknowledge all families;
including those that do not satisfy traditional family norms.
Families can entail three people - mother, father, child - who
never live under the same roof, where the father is active in the
military, lives in another state in a bicoastal marriage or
relationship, or just does not live with the child's mother. The
father may not even be a father at all but another mother in a same-
sex family. The father may even be married to another woman and
have children through that relationship yet still acknowledge and
play a role in the non-traditional family involving another child.
The idea that the United States Supreme Court promulgated
in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 191 that a family is dependant upon the
father's relationship not only with the child but also with the
mother as a marital family is inconsistent with the family that
exists in America today. Reasoning that the integrity of the family
unit should be preserved over the interests of the "adulterous
father," the Michael H. Court denied the biological father legal
parentage rights because the mother's marriage to another man was
still intact at the time of the paternity challenge.'92 The Court
indicated that the legislature could protect the sanctity of the
189 "[A]dults should be discouraged from searching for ways to obtain a 'clean
break' from the children for whom they have voluntarily - - if not always with
full knowledge of the child's biological heritage - - accepted responsibility.
Instead, the assumption of the parental role is a fiduciary responsibility that
should not be easily cast aside." Glennon, supra note 73, at 283.
'90 See infra notes 361-374 and accompanying text. See also Laurence C.
Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond the Biological Tie -
But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 27 (2000).
'9' 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989).192 1d. at 119.
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family over the biological parent's interests.' 93 In addition, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, distinguished situations where the
husband is impotent, sterile or was not cohabitating with the
mother at the time of conception on the basis that the husband
would already know the child was not biologically related to him,
and, therefore, a paternity claim would be less likely to "disrupt an
otherwise harmonious and apparently exclusive marital
relationship."' 194  Although the Court also acknowledged that a
father-child relationship outside a traditional marriage may create
comparable interests to the marital father, the Court noted that
without a tie to the child's mother, the non-marital father's rights
may be limited. 1
95
In its reasoning, Justice Scalia's majority ignored families
beyond the marital unit. By calling the child's other live-in
relationships "quasi-family units," it diminished those relationships
as "seemingly, but not actually;.. .nearly,"' 96 families - an
imitation at best. It failed to acknowledge that families can exist
when the father knows there is no biological connection to the
child, after divorce, without a marriage or lasting relationship
between the mother and father or between members of the same
sex. 197
It was only in Justice Brennan's dissent that non-traditional
families were legitimized based on the parent-child relationship
rather than the mother-father relationship. 198  In denouncing a
state's right to define "what the family should be," Justice Brennan
correctly looked to unwed fathers as an example of protected
19 Id. at 123.
194 Id. at 120, fn.1.
195 Id. at 129 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260, fn. 16, 103 S.Ct.
2985, 2993, fn. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 390, 397, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1770, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979).
196 Black's Law Dictionary, Second Pocket Edition, p.576 (2001). See also
Oxford Pocket American Dictionary of Current English, p. 650 (2002).
197 Justice Stevens, however, acknowledged that "enduring 'family'
relationships may develop in unconventional settings." Ibid. at 133, citing
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) and
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979). In
doing so, he acknowledged the biological father's claim to visitation rights but
concurred in the majority opinion. Id. at 134.
198 Id., at 142. Justices Marshall and Blackmon joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent.
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families. 199  In addition, one of the flaws in the majority's
definition of a family, that families only exist to intact marital
families, was exposed as:
The plurality has wedged itself between a rock and
a hard place. If it limits its holding to those
situations in which a wife and husband wish to raise
the child together, then it necessarily takes the
State's interest into account in defining "liberty";
yet if it extends that approach to circumstances in
which the marital union has already dissolved, then
it may no longer rely on the State's asserted interest
in protecting the "unitary family"... 200
Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H. is consistent with
the types of families that exist in American today, whereas the
majority discounts the value of blended families where a child born
of marriage or a prior non-marital relationship maintains a
relationship with his father while becoming a member of an
additional family born from his mother's marriage to another man.
The relationship with the child's father can, and, according to
sociologists, should, remain intact.201
State courts have also relied on marriage to establish a
family relationship. 20 2 In Sandra S.,2
0 3 Franzel,2°4 and Thomas,20 5
the New York, Michigan and Minnesota courts, respectively,
considered the parents' marital status in determining whether a
family existed. In Sandra S., the court found that even though the
'9 ld., at 143-144.
200 Id., at 147.
201 See supra notes 157-159, 163 and accompanying text. See also Anderlik &
Rothstein supra note 4 at 24.
202 See Sandra S, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 633; Franzel, 516 N.W.2d at 497 (Where the
court indicated that the policies applied to protecting families did not exist since
the parents never married); Garst, 2003 WL 1571704 (Relying on the lack of a
family where the parents lived apart within a few months of the child's birth and
the mother's remarriage in denying the father's argument that he was trying to
preserve a relationship with the child's mother when he initially failed to
challenge paternity); Thomas, 584 N.W.2d at 425.
203 667 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
204 516 N.W.2d at 497.
205 584 N.W.2d at 421.
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father had a "full and active father-son relationship for ten years,"
because the father was not seeking to preserve the relationship and
there was no protected "legal status," as the father under the
marital presumption, there was no family to preserve.206  The
Sandra S. court also relied on the fact that the father-son
relationship deteriorated to the point of no communication during
the year after the father learned of the lack of a biological
connection in reasoning that the child's best interest would not be
served by forcing a relationship that no longer existed.2 °7  The
court stated:
[C]ourts will be more inclined to impose equitable estoppel
to protect the status interests of a child in an already
recognized and operative parent-child relationship.20 8
In addition, the Thomas court reasoned that since the marriage was
no longer intact, the "preservation of the family unit is of minimal
consequence."
209
The approach adopted by the Thomas court encourages the
father to break off the parent-child relationship to avoid child
support obligations. 21  It also, like Michael H., assumes a family
exists only if the parents are involved in an intact marriage. To
make such an assumption excludes all other family relationships
and makes parental choice determinative over the parent-child
relationship. It also prejudices families where marriage is not an
option as with gay or lesbian families since most states do not
recognize the couples' right to marry or create a family.
211
206 667 N.Y.S.2d at 634-635.
207 Id. at 635.
208 Id. at 634, citing Matter of Baby Boy C., 638 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1994).
209 574 N.W.2d at 425.
210 See Anderlick & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 220.
211 Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that a statute that
excluded a gay couple's right to marry lacked a rational basis. See Goodridge v.
Dep't. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961-962, 965 (Mass. 2003). See also
In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570-572 (Mass.
2004)(Responding to Senate request for an opinion as to the constitutionality of
a pending bill that would allow same sex civil unions but not same sex
marriages, the court opined that the proposed bill was unconstitutional). In
addition, San Francisco's mayor ordered the city's marriage license offices to
issue marriage licenses for gay and lesbian couples during the week proceeding
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Likewise, the Michael H., Thomas, Franzel and Sandra S.
courts' reliance on biology and marriage as the constraints in
defining a family ignored other non-traditional families. For
example, in some open adoptions, 212 the biological and adoptive
parents maintain a relationship with each other and the child.
Although the biological parents have no legal rights or
responsibilities over the adopted child, they may be involved in the
child's life. Some families blend in other ways, involving cousins
living as a family in one household under one or multiple sets of
parents, children living with adult siblings without their parents, or
same-sex couples raising the biological or adopted offspring of one
or both the partners. Rather than forcing the legal fiction created
by a strict interpretation of the marital presumption as in Michael
H.,213 the courts need to recognize the relationship between the
214parent and child, not the parents, especially where adult
relationships are less permanent than they were in the 1950s where
the traditional family thrived.2 15
2. Irreparable Harm - The Child Loses When
Biology Determines Who Can And Cannot Be a
Father
No one contests that the child will be harmed when the
only father she knows severs the parent-child relationship for any
reason. Unlike adults, children are less concerned about genetics,
partially because of an infant or child's need for permanence in
their family. 216 The loss of a parent can be devastating to a child,
Valentines Day, 2004, which led to 4037 same sex marriages, as well as several
legal challenges to those marriages and the mayor's authority to order marriage
licenses be issued to gay and lesbian couples. See Harriet Chiang, Lockyer
wants stay on gay marriages suits, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, B3, March 31,
2004, 2004 WL 58593352; Maura Dolan, Is Gay Marriage Ban Constitutional?
Analysts, citing various state rulings, disagree on how the issue is likely to be
resolved, Los ANGELES TIMES, B 1, March 28, 2004, 2004 WL 55902644.
212 An open adoption allows the biological parents to have contact with the
adopted child.
213 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989).
214 See Bartlett, supra note 147, at 924.
215 See Harris, supra note 187, at 485.
216 See Bartlett, supra note 147, at 903. But see Cain v. Cain, 777 S.W.2d 238,
239 (Ky. App. 1989)( After the eleven-year-old child's mother told him that her
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which is even worse when the parent leaves the child or dies.
217
As a result, the child may no longer be able to trust people because
of the loss of the most basic trust - that in a parent. Children think
"...if you can't trust your own parent, you'd better not trust
anyone."2'8
In addition, even if the child wants to continue the
relationship with his father, he has no enforceable remedy under a
biological privilege system. For example, the alleged biological
father in In re Marriage of Adams 219 claimed that the child wanted
to maintain a relationship with the man he knew as his father for
the past ten years. The court indicated that the determination was
not one of the best interests of the child, but whether a legal
relationship existed between the father and child.220 Because the
Illinois statute, a biology-trump statute, allowed the marital
presumption to be rebutted and another man to be adjudicated the
biological father, the husband was relieved of any support
obligation, which was imposed on the biological father without
regard to the child's desires.
221
In a concurring opinion, Justice Cook acknowledged the
purpose of a two-year discovery-based statute of limitations for
challenging paternity, stating:
It is wrong to make a child a part of a family unit
and pass over substantial concerns regarding the
child's paternity only to raise them years later in an
attempt to avoid child support.
222
Even though Justice Cook was surprised by the father's
decision to "abandon that relationship" with the child due to his
wife's conduct, he indicated that it was the father's right to do so
former husband was not his biological father, both father and child suffered
problems until the child refused to see the father and the father eventually
challenged paternity.)
217 See Sandberg, supra note 3 (citing Sandra Moore-Pope, a clinical social
worker in Texas).
219 701 N.E.2d at 1134.
220 id.
221 id.
222 Id., citing In re Marriage of O'Brien, 617 N.E.2d 873, 876 (Il. App. 1993).
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as long as it is within two years of obtaining knowledge of the
possibility that the child is biologically unrelated to him.
223
Because the issue was brought by the alleged biological father in
an attempt to avoid child support obligations himself, Justice Cook
acknowledge the potential harm in allowing an attack on the
father-child relationship and deemed the claimed harm to the child
was not credible. 224  The same result was reached in D.S.M. v.
225L.M., where the Alabama Appellate Court allowed a husband
and father to disestablish a ten-year relationship with his youngest
daughter and declared a stranger to be her legal father. Judge
Yates specially concurred, acknowledging the potential harm to the
child when a presumed father is allowed the choice to either
preserve a legal relationship where no actual one exists or, as in
that case, abandon the actual relationship without considering the
child's interests, and stated:
A child may be psychologically damaged if the
presumed father who has had less contact with the
child than the biological father now asserts the
presumption.. and there may be harm to the child if
the man the child knows as his father suddenly
abandons him.
226
While Judge Yates expressed a desire to consider the best
interests of the child in making paternity decisions, he agreed with
the majority, finding the five-year statute of limitations did not bar
the child's father from contesting paternity. 
227
Some courts justify decisions disestablishing paternity in an
existing father-child relationship by finding that the child suffered
no actual harm, but rather benefited from the father-child
223 id.
224 701 N.E.2d at 1135.
225 2002 WL 1880702 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), cert. quashed 2003 WL 257503
(Ala. 2003).
226 Id. See also R.E. v. C.E.W., 752 So.2d 1019, 1026, (Miss. 2000) (Where the
court referred to the child as the "big loser" in the scenario, having her father of
ten years taken away from her in exchange for a stranger who wanted nothing to
do with her).
227 Id.
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228relationship while it lasted. While the NPA court recognized
that the child who "may have an affinity for the husband as his
father, is an innocent victim of his parent's problems," it dismissed
the potential harm to the child, stating:
[T]he child suffered no detriment by having been cared for
and supported during the five year relationship where no
legal duty to do so existed. In fact, the child has received
the benefit of the husband's love and support.
229
The NPA court also pointed to the fact that the mother and child
could still pursue a paternity claim against the biological father as
justification for allowing the father to disestablish paternity.230 By
acknowledging the potential harm and countering it with the
alleged benefit of the relationship, the court failed to address the
emotional harm the child suffered by ending that parent-child
relationship, and, instead, focused on the financial and emotional
benefit the child received during the relationship.
This temporary benefit outweighs the long-term harm logic
assumes that since the child was technically not entitled to the
love, affection and support of the non-biological father in the first
place, the child could not suffer from the removal of that
relationship, ignoring the reality that a five-year-old child neither
understands nor cares about entitlement or biology. It also
assumes that the child's biological father will step into her life and
pick up where her current father leaves off. That reasoning does
not consider that the biological parent may not desire a relationship
with the child, may not be locatable, or may not be alive. By
failing to address these concerns, the harm to the child and family
is summarily dismissed to preserve the interests of the father and a
biological truth.
228 NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178, 181, 182 (Va. App. 1989).
129 Id. at 181, 182.
230 Id. at 182.
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3. Families Divided - Biological Truths Separate
Siblings and Families by Splitting Biological
Offspring From Non-Biological Offspring in the
Same Family
When there are multiple children, some of which are the
biological offspring of the father while others are not, putting the
father's interests before the family's can create even more harm to
the children within the family. Under a biological privilege
system, the family will be preserved insofar as the biological
offspring are concerned, but not for the other children. A father
who has an established parent-child relationship with the children
will now only visit, support and invest emotionally and financially
in the biological children, excluding the others.
231
This can create a rift in the family, as well as between the
siblings.232 In addition, it would change everything the siblings, as
well as the biologically-unrelated child, came to rely upon about
their family.233 For example, in the Wise case, if the biological
privilege applied, Wise could stop visiting three of his four
children, only financially and emotionally supporting the
biological child. He would not even be entitled to see the other
children because, in a pure biological-privilege system, all rights or
obligations to those children are extinguished upon proof that they
are biologically unrelated to him.
234
Similarly, in cases where some siblings are biologically
related to the father but others are not, the courts fail to address the
potential harm to the family unit.235 In those cases, the father
maintained visitation, custody, and decision-making rights over the
biologically-related children, but forfeited all rights to the child
where paternity was contested.
231 See Chezem & Nagy, supra note 64 at 479. See also Glennon, supra note 73,
at 272.
232 See Glennon, supra note 73, at 272.
233 See Martin Bentham & Lorraine Fraser, Move to outlaw secret DNA testing
by fathers, TELEGRAPH NEws at http://portal.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2002%2F05%2F1 9%2Fndna 1 9.xml (last visited
May 19, 2002.)
234 See C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995) (holding that ex-boyfriend of
mother could not continue a relationship with a child, who he had known for
several years, under the law).
235 See NPA, 380 S.E.2d 178; Smith, 487 S.E.2d at 95.
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Because the courts fail to consider the rights of siblings or
the impact of split visitation on an existing family, the actual harm
to the family is unknown. While multiple children of one mother
often have different fathers without disturbing the family
dynamics, there is a difference between that situation and the one
occurring with paternity challenges because the children in the
latter case never believed themselves to have different fathers. The
child losing the father enjoyed a parent-child relationship with the
now absent, yet present, father, will be saddened seeing his
siblings interact with his father to his exclusion. A worse result
would occur in same sex families where the children are each
biologically unrelated to the other. There, when the couple splits,
the children also split, physically, and legally; never having the
opportunity or right to see each other again.
This is a vastly different scenario than when several fathers
have always played a role in the family dynamics. Unlike the
scenario where the family unit is expanded into subunits with each
child's father playing a role in the family as a whole, in the
paternity fraud scenario, only part of the family relationship among
the siblings and father is lost.
4. Children in Limbo - Biology Gives Fathers 18
Years to Challenge Paternity
Another problem with pure biological privilege laws is that
they lack finality for the child. If the father is allowed to challenge
paternity at any time during the child's minority, the child can
never rely on a generally-accepted concept that the man he calls
daddy will remain his father.z36 Since children need a sense of
security in their family relationships, this uncertainty may have
long-term affects associated with a nagging doubt the child may
feel, especially if the parents fight and threaten each other with the
possibility of genetic testing within the child's presence.
For example, in Knill v. Knill,237 when the couples'
youngest child was twelve years old, the child's mother informed
him that his father was not biologically related to him. The father,
still married to the child's mother at the time, comforted his son
236 See Boccella, supra note 12.
237 510 A.2d 546 (Md. App. 1986).
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and told him that although they were not biologically related, he
238still loved him. The parents separated two years later, at which
time the father continued to support all three children until the
mother asked for child support in the divorce action.239 At that
time, the father denied paternity of the youngest child and sought
relief from child support for that child, indicating that he could not
be the child's biological father because he had had a vasectomy a
year and a half before the child was born.24° Although the court
recognized the child's reliance on the twelve-year relationship with
his father, as well as his father's surname, because the child
suffered no financial detriment during those twelve years, the
father was no longer required to support him.24 1 Rather, the court
indicated that the child's mother should look to the "natural" father
242to support the child.
The court's reliance solely on a monetary detriment to the
child failed to consider the actual detriment to the child - the loss
of the parent-child relationship and the change in the family
dynamics due to the exclusion of that child only from visitation
with his father.
In addition to challenging paternity, the biological privilege
also leaves the child in limbo by allowing a father or mother to
threaten their child with the possibility of a paternity challenge as a
means of securing the child's obedience or allegiance, even if there
is no basis to doubt the child's paternity. Dad could infer that he
would not be obligated to pay for Junior's ivy league education, if
he is not biologically related to Junior, in an attempt to force Junior
to follow in his footsteps, abandon a course of study, or even deter
a choice in girlfriends. Likewise, in a divorce proceeding, a
husband could threaten the wife with a paternity challenge if she
seeks marital property rights. It could also be used as a weapon in
child support disputes whereby the father could threaten to subject
the child to paternity tests if the mother seeks an increase in child
support, or opposes a visitation request or modification. Women
238 Id. at 547.
239 Id.
240 id.
241 Id. at 551-552.
242 Id. at 552. The court also reasoned that the child's mother created any
emotional detriment by disclosing the child's illegitimacy to him, as well as
their other children. Id. at 551.
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would be forced to negotiate spousal and child support in
exchange for protection of the child's sense of identity. Just as
when mothers gave up alimony and property distribution rights to
avoid custody disputes in the past, the same situation could occur
to protect the children from a potential paternity challenge. Even
where the mother knows there are no other potential fathers, the
mere threat of the challenge and what it would do to the children
emotionally 243 may be enough to influence her other decisions
during the divorce. The potential for abuse of power that comes
along with a biology-privileged society would take us back to
where we have been - a system where children were nothing more
than the property of their fathers, 244 and they, like families, lived
and died at the whim of the father.
5. Social Strangers - Biology Allows Third Parties
to Interfere With the Family
In addition, when biology is a preferred privilege, it also
drives a wedge in the family by giving a third party rights to a
child in the family. 245 Because over two-thirds of the states have
some sort of inclusion law that allows biological fathers to
challenge paternity while the marriage or family is intact,246 the
possibility of third-party paternity claims is not remote given
biology trump laws.
The effect of allowing third-party paternity challenges is
that the ties binding the marriage together begin to unravel. Even
if the third-party is not the child's biological father, the possibility
243 See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
244 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 223 (stating, "For much of history,
children had a legal status little different from property. Children born outside of
marriage were in the most precarious position, legally and socially. Prompted by
affection, or something else, a man might claim a child and so bestow the
benefits of status.").
245 See Roberts, supra note 109 at 44-45, 56, noting that some states do not
allow the intrusion into an intact family based on a best interest of the child
standard while "[o]thers, emphasizing the importance of biology, allow the case
to proceed." See also K.S. v. R.S., 699 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1996); Russell, 682
N.E.2d 513.
246 Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed
Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 373-374 (1988).
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that he is the biological parent is enough to plant doubt and
mistrust into the marriage and family. Because some statutes
allow anyone who claims to be a biological father to bring an
action to establish paternity, 24 7 the potential for third-party
intrusion into the family looms inevitably unless the biological
privilege is hemmed in. Likewise, this intrusion into the parent-
child relationship is enough to do the same harm genetic testing
does to the child.248
Third-party paternity challenges occur when the wife has
an affair during the marriage and the male adulterer decides,
whether based on innuendo, rumor or bald eagle evidence, that the
child could be his. This conjecture leads to a paternity challenge
during or after the marriage or when family dynamics change, and
can occur at any time before the child is born until the child
reaches eighteen. For example, in Witso v. Overby,249 a male
paramour of a married woman brought an action to establish
paternity of the woman's one-year-old child. 250 Although the
woman admitted that she had a sexual relationship with the
paramour around the time the child was conceived, the husband
and wife contested the request for genetic testing, asserting the
marital presumption.
25'
The trial court ordered genetic testing but sealed the results
and certified the issue of whether the paramour could assert the
paternity claim based on the wife's admitted having sexual
relations with him for appeal.252 The appellate court held that the
paramour had a right to genetic testing and to establish the
paternity of the child regardless of the child's parents' marital
status. After the testing was performed, the court considered the
247 See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-104; Ind. Code Ann. §31-6-6.1-2 (West Supp.
1992); Minn. Stat. § 257.55 Subdiv. l(f). See also R.N. v. J.M., 615 S.W.3d 149
(Ark. 2001).
248 See supra note 2 18 and infra notes 269-322 and accompanying text.
249 609 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. App. 2000), aff'd. 627 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 2001),
cert. denied 534 U.S. 1130, 122 S.Ct. 1069, 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). See also
G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So.2d 1382 (Fla. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1997) (allowing an HLA
test that determined the paramour was the child's biological father, but denied
him any rights to the child because of the existing marital presumption).250 Witso, 609 N.W.2d at 619.
251 Id.
252 id.
253 Id. at 621-22.
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competing presumptions of legitimacy and biological paternity and
weighed them based on policy and logic. 254 The court considered
the "blood relationships, marriage, and the best interests of the
child" in determining the presumed biological father to be the
"legal" father.
255
The Witso court reasoned that if genetic testing were
denied, men would seek self-help measures that could be
disruptive to the child's well-being.256 Although discouraging self-
help testing, the court noted what it called "the limited
consequence from allowing...genetic testing.' 257 In doing so, the
court failed to address the potential harm to the child created by the
doubt testing causes. Rather, it discounted the impact of the
process of testing and focused on the analysis that would occur
after the testing.
Another flaw in the Witso court's logic is in its assumption
that the knowledge of the test results would not affect the family.
Given the history of men who, once paternity is disestablished,
abandon their children, the harm is already done once genetic
testing is ordered. In addition, because the decision leaves the
door open to any man who had a sexual relationship with a married
or cohabitating woman to petition for genetic testing at any point
during the child's minority, the potential exists for an ex-paramour
to make a claim of biological parentage of a sixteen-year-old child
who has lived with his parents with no contact or relationship with
the ex-paramour until, after running into the child years later,
deems that the child resembles him and that he now wants to play
daddy.
The nontraditional family is at an even greater risk to such
an intrusion because, unprotected by the marital presumption
unless the parents cohabitated during a protected period of time
during the child's life, the alleged biological father will not face
the weighing process afforded under the marital presumption.
Instead, the biological presumption will prevail and the existing
father will find himself in a position of having to overcome that
presumption without any protection or basis in statutory or
254 Id. at 623.
255 id.
256 Id.
257 id.
258 Id.
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common law paternity laws. Genetic testing will be ordered,
subjecting the child and his family to biological information they
may not want to know. Likewise, a same-sex couple would have
no protection from third-party paternity challenges as it is
impossible that either both fathers or mothers would be
biologically related to the child, making the challenge by a
biologically related adult a guaranteed familial intrusion.
The "biological truth" may also serve no purpose in states
where the marital presumption applies over a biological connection
because the ex-paramour would be unable to overcome the marital
presumption where the child has an established sixteen-year
relationship with his father. Even so, the child's father may, if the
results include the paramour and exclude himself, choose to
abandon his son a week, month or even year after the proceedings,
leaving the child fatherless and destroying what was a happy,
functioning family.
In states where a complete biology privilege exists, the
result is worse because, like the nontraditional family, even a
marital family is afforded no protection against a biological
paternity claim. In those situations, not only is the paramour
entitled to force the family to undergo genetic testing, he is also
able to thrust himself into the middle of what might be a perfectly
happy, functioning family. 260 This creates a class of children who
are presumptively legitimate but are actually illegitimate by virtue
of their biological lineage.26'
In addition, the certainty of the family unit, traditional or
otherwise, would be replaced with the constant fear that it could be
challenged at any moment - that a perfect stranger could step into
a child's life at any time and claim to be his father. A child could
never be sure that the man he calls father will not be displaced by a
259 It is possible that a lesbian couple would both have an arguable biological
link to the child if one woman donated the egg that was placed in the other
partner.
60 This author contends that the mere happening of an affair or sexual encounter
does not mean the family cannot be happy and properly functioning given that
6eople make mistakes and can and have been forgiven for them.
61 Chezem & Nagy, supra note 64 at 473. Hon. Chezem and Nagy argue that
"... the paradox created by the Indiana Supreme Court is that such a child is per
se a child born out of wedlock, regardless of the third party challenge to
paternity." See also Armstrong, supra note 110 at 395.
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neighbor, colleague of his mother, or a one-night stand, who would
have visitation, custody and control over the child with a simple
allegation of timely sexual conduct and a swab of the mouth.262
Arguably, with the existence of so many blended families
where children live with stepparents, the rights of a paramour
would be similar to those of the father when the mother
remarries. 263 However, the reality is that the existing father in the
remarriage scenario presumably already has a developed
relationship with the child whereas the aramour may very well be
a stranger to the seven-year-old child.
2V
Allowing a biological truth to act as a preference over an
established parent-child relationship also creates a policy
privileging thirty seconds of lust over an established family unit. 
2 5
To do so means the accidental conception is more important than
the choice to create a family, 266 rewarding an act of self-indulgence
in the heat of the moment over years of a loving, functional father-
child relationship. It makes an act that was once illegal, adultery, a
weapon against the family, not only displacing the child's father
but also privileging the adulterer's rights over the child's. 267 In
essence the sperm donor, 268 a paramour, should have no right to
destroy the child and family for his own self-indulgence.
262 See Jeffrey A. Parness, Old Fashioned Pregnancy, Newly Fashioned
Paternity, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 57, 61 (2003). Analyzing the effect of Indiana
law that allows a challenge to the marital presumption and arguing for the legal
recognition of multiple fathers, Parness indicated that "... many actual fathers
can never gain legal recognition; some, in fact, may be removed from their
children due to a later-recognized legal paternity or legal fatherhood of another.
Thus, a legal paternity designation for one man can override the actual
fatherhood of a second man in some settings. Yet elsewhere, a later legal
paternity designation for one man can be foreclosed by the actual fatherhood of
another man." See also Armstrong, supra note 110 at 370.
263 See Glennon, supra note 109 at 592.
264 See Armstrong, supra note 110 at 406 (arguing that a putative father is not
"interchangeable" with husbands and fathers who have a developed relationship
with the child.
265 Id. at 399-400.
266 id.
267 Id. at 400, 401, 404. Equating the paramour with a sperm donor, Armstrong
argues that the adulterous male, knowing he is involved in an illicit affair,
should know he has no rights to the family created by the marriage, and,
therefore, should have no expectation of that right.
268 Id. at 404.
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B. The Wrong Kind of Certainty - A Biological Truth
Does More Harm Than Good and Often Doesn't
Change the Paternity Decision
No court can undo the damage that is done after the father
learns, either through DNA or other genetic testing, that the child
he raised for the past two, six or even eighteen years is not from
his loins. No matter how much a father loves his son, once that
piece of paper comes back "EXCLUDED," meaning he is
excluded as a possible biological father of the child, the potential
ramifications must be considered. Even where the father asks the
court for testing and represents that he will continue paying child
support regardless of the outcome of the tests, which he wants just
for his own peace of mind,269 once he knows the child's DNA
came from someone other than himself, the promise becomes
meaningless.
For example, in Wachter v. Ascero,270 the mother and father
agreed to forego HLA testing ordered during the divorce
proceedings when the child was about two years old.27 1 Two years
later, the father, after having remained in contact with the child
through visitation, 27  petitioned to reopen the paternity
determination and for HLA testing, claiming he agreed not to test
earlier because of his ex-wife's pleas to spare the child that he
loved.273
At the time of his petition, the father represented that he
was not trying to avoid his financial obligation towards the child,
and promised to continue paying child support, regardless of the
274outcome of the genetic testing. The court granted the testing,
269 See Wachter v. Ascero, 550 A.2d 1019, 1020 (Pa. Super. 1988).
270 id.
271 Id. at 1020.
272 Id. at 1021.
273 Id. at 1020.
274 Id. See also Ince v. Ince, 58 S.W.3d 187, 189 (Tex. App. 2001) (denying
action by father who sought to have DNA testing eleven years after the divorce
decree acknowledged his paternity to determine whether his daughter had a
genetic problem, then, after the results excluded him as father, he sought a bill
of review to set aside his child support obligation).
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noting that it was unnecessary because paternity was decided based
on the father's promise to maintain his support obligation. 5
Once the test results excluded him as the child's biological
father, however, the man who previously gave his word that he
would continue to support his child, nonetheless filed a petition to
276vacate the child support order. The appellate court affirmed the
denial of the father's petition based on res judicata and equitable
estoppel principles, indicating that "blood tests should not have
been ordered...even for humanitarian purposes, and should never
be ordered unless it is to establish paternity in a proceeding where
paternity is a relevant fact and has not already been determined in a
prior proceeding." 
277
While the father may have intended all along to deny
paternity once the test results were received, curiosity and doubt
may have also motivated his request. The result, however, was the
same. In a state such as Pennsylvania, 278 which has not enacted
paternity fraud legislation, the tests were irrelevant to the legal
outcome of the case. Genetic testing was unnecessary, would not
change the outcome of the child support obligation or visitation
rights of the father, and would have no legal effect.
Even so, once performed, genetic testing would, and did,
change everything. Once the father knew he was biologically
unrelated to the child, no matter how much he claimed to love her
before the test results were disclosed, once the biological truth was
learned, he no longer wanted to be her father and petitioned to end
279his financial obligation to the child.
His motive, if one assumes money was not his initial
motivation, was not revealed in the decision, but the harm to the
genetic problem, then, after the results excluded him as father, he sought a bill
of review to set aside his child support obligation).
275 Wachter, 550 A.2d at 1020.
276 id.
277 Id. at 1021.
278 Pennsylvania has no paternity fraud laws but does currently permit the
legitimacy presumption to be rebutted by genetic test results. See 23 PA.
CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 5104 (2002) "Blood tests to determine paternity: (g)
Effect on presumption of legitimacy. - - The presumption of legitimacy of a
child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of
all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the
husband is not the father of the child." (emphasis added).
279 Wachter, 550 A.2d at 1020.
2003]
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol7/iss1/4
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
child was. While he may have felt victimized by both his ex-wife
and the court,28° the child was victimized by her own father, who
only wanted her when he thought he was biologically related to
her.
Furthermore, allowing a paramour to undergo genetic
testing when it is not admissible or cannot impact the outcome of
281the case as in G.F.C. v. S.G., can do nothing but harm the
family. In G.F.C., the husband moved to dismiss G.F.C.'s petition
to establish paternity of the husband and wife's child.282 Before
the trial court ruled on the husband's motion, the judge ordered
HLA tests that confirmed that G.F.C. was the child's biological
parent.283 Notwithstanding the test results, the husband's motion to
dismiss was granted based on the marital presumption, as well as
the following facts: 1) the husband's name appeared on the child's
birth certificate; 2) the husband filed an affidavit acknowledging
paternity of the child; 3) the husband held the child out as his own;
and 4) the intact status of the family before and since the child's
284birth. The appellate court confirmed the decision, indicating
that without an established relationship between the paramour and
the child, there would be no basis to break up the intact family,
and, therefore, the marital presumption barred the paramour's
action.
285
The trial court's logic in ordering the HLA tests first and
ruling on the motion to dismiss later was flawed in that the test
results were irrelevant to the outcome of the motion just as in
Wachter, which was decided on the basis of the marital
presumption and the biological father's lack of an established
relationship with the child, as well as the lack of any evidence of
280 See Boccella, supra note 12. Res judicata and equitable estoppel are equated
by paternity fraud proponents to the procedural technicality that unjustly
imprisons him in financial jail for the next fourteen years. Assembly Committee
on Judiciary April 16, 2002 Hearing, Comments. See also Jim Herron Zamora,
The New Paternity; DNA adds twist to definition of 'Dad', SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, June 17, 2001 at A-4 (indicating that while DNA evidence frees
criminals, it does not necessarily free men from child support obligations);
Harris, supra note 187.
281 686 So.2d 1382 (FI. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1997).
282 Id. at 1383.
283 id.284 id.
211 Id. at 1385.
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286
abuse, abandonment or neglect by the husband. Had the court
decided the legal issue first, there would have been no basis for
ordering the genetic testing. While the child's father wanted to
maintain his relationship with the child since he was involved in
the marital relationship and family unit, he may later become
dissatisfied with the marital relationship and do exactly what the
policy sought to avoid in the original petition - abandon, abuse or
287neglect the child. In any event, a family, albeit possibly fragile
by the very adultery that occurred, is now in danger of extinction
because the court privileged biology at the cost of the parent-child
relationship and the family.
Allowing the father to proceed with genetic testing when
the results are not admissible or through self-help mechanisms
such as independent testing labs 288 also creates a perceived truth
that overrides the parent-child relationship regardless of the
admissibility of the test results in the paternity action. The courts
and legislatures might as well allow the father to set aside the
paternity judgment and vacate the child support order if they are
going to continue endorsing testing. By ordering genetic testing
before its admissibility is determined and condoning self-help
testing, the damage is already done to the child's relationships with
his family.
Some statutes even require the father to conduct DNA
testing before moving to set aside a paternity determination. 289 In
Marriage of Kates, the father had a vasectomy prior to the child's
conception, yet claimed he was "uncertain" whether he was the
286 Id. at 1385-87.
287 This is not to suggest there is any evidence or reason to suspect abuse in this
case. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
288 See www.swabtest.com (DNA home swab tests by Genex Diagnostics, a
company based in Seattle, Washington and Canada); www.prophase-
genetics.com (offering home swab DNA tests for $165); www.paternity-
answers.com (offering home swab DNA tests for $230);
www.dnatestingplace.com. (offering free home DNA tests from Ana-Gen
Technologies testing company); and www.paternity.us (offering home DNA
tests for $210 from the American Paternity Center but indicating that it cannot
ship to addresses in New York because of New York laws).
289 Marriage of Kates, 761 N.E.2d 153, 156 (I11. 2001) (citing 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 45/7(b-5) (West 2000)); R.L.T. v. S.V.P., 703 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1997) (citing ALA. CODE § 26-17A-l(a) (1975)).
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child's biological father at the time of the child's birth.29 ° When
he divorced the child's mother, he chose to remain on the child's
birth certificate and pay nominal child support, twenty dollars per
week, to maintain visitation rights.29' It was not until his child
support obligation was increased that he challenged the child's
paternity, claiming his former wife agreed not to seek increases in
the amount. 29 2  When he petitioned to set aside his paternity
obligation under Illinois's paternity fraud laws, the court rejected
his petition because he failed to obtain DNA tests before bringing
the petition, a condition precedent to filing an action to set aside
paternity under the statute. 293
Even in White v. Armstrong, where the court denied a
father's request for genetic testing, the father sought self-help
testing and used those results to successfully challenge paternity.
There, the father failed to request genetic testing when the parties
legally separated, claiming he did not want to know the truth and
that he relied on his former wife's representations that their two
sons were his biological offspring.295 Armstrong, however,
claimed she told White he was not the biological father of the
oldest son while she was pregnant.
296
After the Juvenile court denied his contest at the paternity
establishment proceeding, White paid child support and exercised
his visitation rights for several years before the child told White
that he had two fathers, something he apparently learned from his
mother. 297 After White's request for genetic testing was denied by
the Juvenile court, he sought self-help testing that excluded him as
298the biological father of his oldest son. Armed with this
290 761 N.E.2d at 156.
291 Id. at 155.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 157.
294 1999 WL 33085 (Tenn. App. 1999). See also Brian B. v. Dionne B., 699
N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2 1999) (holding that the father be equitably
estopped from contesting paternity eleven years after the original determination
even though the results of self-help genetic tests indicated that he was not the
biological father of the child).
295 id.
296 id.
297 id.
298 id.
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knowledge, he again challenged his son's paternity, this time
successfully.
299
Once again, the court focused on the wrongs of the wife
rather than the acts of the father in seeking self-help testing after a
denial of a request for court-ordered testing. By granting the father
relief from his parenting obligations, the court rewarded his
conduct. This makes fathers more likely to seek self-help genetic
testing because it could create an additional opportunity to contest
paternity. Rather than preserve whatever family relationship
exists, by condoning self-help remedies, the courts ultimately
condone voluntary destruction of the family.
Self-help genetic testing may also result in the father
severing relations with the child, including visitation and custody
rights, before a court rules on the admissibility or effect of the test
results. The father may also stop paying child support until the
state garnishes his wages, if he earns any. He may even tell the
child that he is not her father.
The father in Miscovich v. Miscovichs °° did just that. After
seeking self-help DNA tests on himself and his four-year-old son,
he stopped all contact with the child after telling the child that he
was not his father. 30 1 Up until that point, Miscovich lived with his
son and wife and established a parent-child relationship with his
son. 302 Because the court did not believe the marital presumption
was overcome, the self-help DNA tests were not admissible and
Miscovich remained the legal father.
30 3
Regardless of the court's ruling, the damage was done. The
relationship forged during the first two years of his son's life was
severed for the five years while the paternity challenge was
pending. The child, then nine, had already lost his father, who
walked out of his life when the DNA results revealed the skewed
truth about the child's paternity - that biology, not the existing
parent-child relationship mattered more to the father than the child
did. The courts can order Miscovich and others like him to pay
child support, but they cannot order those men who have
299 id.
3' 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. 1997), aff'd. 720 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied
526 U.S. 1113, 119 S.Ct. 1757, 143 L.Ed. 2d 789 (1999).
30i Id. at 727-28.
302 Id. at 727, 733.
303 Id. at 730.
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emotionally abandoned their children to resume the parent-child
relationship and restore the family to where it was before the
biological truth destroyed it.
Watcher and Miscovich are not the only cases where the
father's perception of his child changed when genetic test results
determined that the child was not biologically his.
304
In many cases, a paying male who believes he is not
the biological father will have no interest in
maintaining a relationship. He will view the
relationship as a financial strain, based on a legal
error that is impossible to remedy. Even granting
visitation will not foster a loving relationship
between the two.
30 5
This sentiment that a biological truth destroys a parent-child reality
is not unusual. Many of the cases that led to legislative changes
and proposed paternity laws involve fathers who cut off ties with
their children after being excluded as the biological father. 306 One
such father, Franklin Simmons, attempted to sever all relations
with his son, claiming he could no longer love the child.
307
Simmons described his feelings in a court affidavit stating, "I am
incapable morally and emotionally of providing any of the love,
affection and nurturing that is needed and required for this young
304 See State ex rel. Russell, 2003 WL 1787326; Sandra S., 667 N.Y.S.2d 632;
State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 995 S.W.2d 338 (Ark.
1999) (indicating that ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115(d) (Supp 1995), and
common law cases that allow the adjudicated father to set aside a paternity
judgment when genetic testing excludes him as the father did not apply to
paternity decisions in divorce proceedings); John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380
(Pa. 1990); Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. 1988); William L. v. Cindy
E.L., 495 S.E.2d 836 (W.Va. 1997); Brian B., 699 N.Y.S.2d 491 (discussing
how the father severed his bond with the child before he moved to set aside the
paternity determination); Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001).
05 Louis J. Tesser, Dad or Duped? Post-Appeal Challenges to Paternity
Judgments, 20 No. 2 GPSoLo 18 (2003).
306 See Wise, 49 S.W.3d at 453. See also Boccella, supra note 12 (reporting on
the Miscovitch case where the father cut off ties to his four-year-old son after
being excluded as the biological parent); Sandberg, supra note 3 (reporting on
the Simmons case where the father sought to cut all ties with his thirteen-year-
old son after genetic testing excluded him as the biological father).
307 Sandberg, supra note 3.
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man. 3 °8  Simmons language indicates that he could not even
acknowledge his child after thirteen years, calling him "this young
man." The parent-child relationship could not overcome the
biological truth created in the mind of the child's father.
Therefore, when courts privilege biology over an existing parent-
child relationship, the combination creates a harm so egregious that
it cannot be undone. The father cannot return to the relationship.
The mere knowledge of the biological truth undoes what years of
shared experiences, parenting, love and affection created - a father
and a family. Simmons is not the only example of a father who
abandoned his child after obtaining genetic testing. 30 9 Others such
as Carnell Smith also walked away from a long-term relationship
with their child.
310
Those who advocate the position that biology should not
matter, though correct in theory, miss the point. 311 It does matter.
Proponents of paternity fraud laws cannot admit the likely result of
the laws - mass re-litigation of past paternity and child support
cases - because to do so would stall or kill the proposed laws.
Instead, they use men like Wise and McCarthy, two men who have
continued their relationships with their non-biological children, to
promote the laws.
312
Even fathers who fought for custody and still maintain
relationships with their children to whom they that they are
biologically unrelated, admit that the relationship, and the way
they feel about their children, changed after they learned they were
308 id.
309 See generally Ellen Goodman, What makes a father?, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
April 18, 2001.
31°See Harris, supra note 187.
311 See Boccella, supra note 12 "'I would think if there's a close parent-child
relationship, then the matter of whose DNA the child is carrying wouldn't
matter that much,' said Laura Morgan, chairwoman of the American Bar
Association's Child Support Committee. 'It's too easily reducing parentage to
dollars and DNA."' The article also indicates that "Those pressing for the new
laws say they do not anticipate wide-scale child abandonment. Cohen, a lawyer
who has represented both men and women in these types of cases, said that
'when [fathers] have a relationship with their son or daughter, they don't
necessarily walk away from the child. They just don't want to have the financial
responsibility."'
312 Zamora, supra note 21 at A-4. See also Sandberg, supra note 3; Boccella,
supra note 12.
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not biological parents. Wise admitted that although he still loves
"'those kids as much as ever... I can't say my feelings haven't
changed,''313 as evidenced by his attempt to set aside his child
support obligations, and the filing of a fraud case against his ex-
wife.3 14 Likewise, McCarthy, the New Jersey man who lost his
challenge to vacate a $280 monthly child support order once he
learned that his fourteen-year-old daughter was biologically
unrelated to him, now has a "strained relationship" with his
daughter.
315
Not only is the impact of genetic testing irreversible
in the eyes of the father, it is equally permanent in
those of the children. This was recognized by the
court in Judson v. Judson,316 where the father's
request for paternity testing was denied in a divorce
proceeding under equitable estoppel and best
interest of the children policy considerations.
31 7
The court noted that even being tested would harm the
children.318 Acknowledging that children are not naive, the court
implied that children would themselves begin to doubt their
father's paternity once the testing occurred.319
"Defendants... should not be provided a legal vehicle whose chief
use will be to embarrass their wives and injure innocent children in
a manner no decent man would use under normal circumstances."
320
The acknowledgement that children, especially those old
enough to comprehend that even the least invasive swab test is
designed to question their relationship, 321 will be harmed by the
very test itself militates in favor of precluding testing. While the
test results could arguably be cause for celebration of the father-
313 Zamora, supra note 21, at A-4.
314 49 S.W.3d at 453.
315 Boccella, supra note 12.
316 1995 WL 476848 (Conn. Super. 1995).
317 id.
318 Id., citing Commonwealth v. Weston, 193 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 1963).
3 19 
id.
320 id, at *3..
321 See supra note 70.
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child relationship if they confirm biological parentage, the very
fact that one's father would desire to question his relationship with
the child could be devastating to a child, especially in the teen
years, where self-identity is a growing concern.
322
Arguably, the unnecessary harm to the child and family
could be remedied by adopting the approach of a complete
biological privilege, which would then justify the harm by
enforcing the parent's interests over the child's. However, since
there is no way to undo genetic testing and the impact it has on the
family once the results are disclosed, the only way to avoid the
potential harm to the child and family is to remove the opportunity
to obtain the weapon in the first place - to make unauthorized
genetic testing illegal.
C. Conjecture and Rumor - Basing Paternity
Challenges on Perceived Truths
While South Carolina is the only state that formally
acknowledges bald eagle evidence as admissible to prove or
disprove paternity,3 23 in other states, bald eagle evidence is often
the impetus for challenging paternity. 324  This is because the
322 See Bartlett, supra note 147 at 903, 904-05, stating that Infants need
continuity of attachment and the feeling of permanence gained from belonging
to a group - a family where "members share a commitment to one another." Id.
at 903 Teenagers, however, need a sense of their heritage.
323 See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-956(B) (2002).
324 See State ex rel., Russell, 2003 WL 1787326; People v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327
(Colo. 2002) (reviewing a case where the adjudicated father challenged paternity
when the child's mother sent him a photograph of his eleven-year-old son with
whom he had no relationship and the father noticed that the child's facial
features differed from his own. The court denied the request for genetic testing
based on a policy favoring finality in paternity determinations); Paternity of
Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488; Lillibridge v. Lillibridge, 1999 WL 395385 (Conn.
App. 1999); Delcore v. Mansi, 692 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. 2 Dept. 1999);
McDaniel v. McDaniel, 716 So.2d 737 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); Miscovitch, 688
A.2d 726; State Department of Human Resources v. Shinall, 941 P.2d 616 (Or.
App. 1997); Thomas v. Rosasco, 640 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996);
DCSE v. Felix M., 1996 WL 799133 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1996) (finding that father
did not have valid reason to dismiss support obligations since he previously
claimed to be the child's father); Franzel, 516 N.W.2d 495; Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d
597; N.C. v. W.R.C., 317 S.E.2d 793 (W.Va. 1984). See also Moody v.
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common law required the father to establish newly discovered
evidence or fraud to open a paternity determination, and many
existing paternity laws require a father to bring an action to set
aside a paternity determination within a certain number of years
after the father had reason to believe the child was not his
biological offspring. 325  As a result, bald eagle evidence, and
claims that the child's eyes, hair, or toes now do not look like the
father's, as well as newly-discovered rumors that the child's
mother had other sexual partners at the time the child was
conceived are common reasons asserted in a paternity contest.
Junior's failure to be the spitting image of dad may not
normally cause a man to question his paternity as there are a lot of
families with children who resemble other relatives even though
they do not resemble their parents. However, when the loving
marital or family relationship ends, the father takes a second look
at Junior - especially when Junior costs him eight hundred dollars
a month in child support.
In the Russell 26 case, the father suspected that his four-
year-old son was not biologically related to him at the time of
divorce. His doubts were partially motivated by his son's facial
features failing to resemble his own as the child grew older.
327
328Likewise, in Miscovich v. Miscovich, the color of the child's
eyes was the key to the father's biological-based paternity
challenge. There, the father had blue eyes like his then wife and
their son had brown eyes.3 29 Nothing more or less was necessary
Christiansen, 306 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 1981) (declaring testimony of similarity of
father's facial features to the child should be considered among other evidence
of paternity such as timely sexual intimacy); Commonwealth ex rel. Lonesome
v. Johnson, 331 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. Super. 1974) (considering the physical
resemblance of the children to the father along with sexual intimacy and other
evidence of paternity in the father).
325 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
326 2003 WL 1787326.
327 Id. The court noted, however, that the child's grade school photographs
"reflect a striking resemblance" to the grade school photographs of Russell, the
child's mother's second husband.327 Although genetic testing excluded West as
the biological parent of his son, his failure to bring the challenge until more than
ten years after the divorce and his suspicions gave rise to a finding of res
Judicata and barred his challenge to paternity and the child support order.
28 688 A.2d 726.
329 Id. at 727.
[Vol. 7
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
THE DAY THE FAMILY DIEs
for Miscovich to challenge the child's paternity. Still, he
employed self-help DNA tests that proved what his suspicions
already told him; that the child was biologically unrelated to
him.
330
There have also been instances where the child's racial
features were the motivation for challenging paternity.331 The
father in Paternity of Cheryl 332 used his daughter's light-
complexion (in contrast to that of both parents) as part of the basis
for his motion to set aside his acknowledgement of paternity.
Similarly, the father in Jeffries v. Moore333 also used racial
characteristics to challenge paternity. There, a paramour filed an
action to establishnpaternity and custody rights of a child born to a
married woman. 33  The court held that evidence demonstrating
that the husband was not the biological father, beyond lack of
access, impotence or sterility, included "evidence of perceived
racial differences between the mother, presumed father [the
husband] and child....335
Comparing the child to her mother and father, the Jeffries
court noted that she resembled neither of them in that they both
had very white skin while the child, like the paramour, appeared to
330 id.
331 See Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 480; Jeffries, 559 S.E.2d 217; Hess v.
Whitsitt, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1967) (relying on the "mixed
blood" of the child as having black and Caucasian characteristics where the
woman's other two children were brought in, and, like her, they were fair
skinned and blonde to establish paternity of father where married woman had an
affair). See also Glenn Sacks, California Paternity Justice Act. If the Genes
Don't Fit, You Must Acquit, May 27, 2003, available at
http://www.glennsacks.com/california-paternity-justice.htm (describing a case
where the father was black and the child was white. The father commented on
his frustration with the court system, noting: "'The judge refused to consider the
DNA evidence - - not to mention the obvious evidence fight in front of
him...'); Department of Public Welfare of City of New York v. Hamilton, 126
N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (N.Y. 1953) (indicating expert testimony would be
admissible to disprove paternity based on racial characteristics)
This article will not address the potential discrimination or other racial issues
that may arise from the use of bald eagle evidence in the form of racial
stereotypes or features.
332 746 N.E.2d 488.
3 559 S.E.2d 217.
334 Id. at 218.
311 Id. at 219.
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be of "'a mixed ancestry, including African-American
ancestry.' ' '336 In addition, the court noted that the child resembled
the paramour, not her father. 337 Relying on those racial differences,
as well as the paramour's access to the mother during the period of
likely conception, the court found that the paramour successfully
rebutted the marital presumption.
338
Not all bald eagle evidence revolves around the child's
appearance, skin color or physical characteristics. Sometimes, the
father challenges paternity claiming the son lacked the father's
natural ability or talent as in Simmons, where the father claimed he
questioned his son's paternity because the child was not as athletic
as Simmons. 339 In another case, an adjudicated absentee father
also claimed the child had a different personality than himself.
340
Although the court failed to comment on the bald eagle allegations,
it ordered blood tests in both cases.
34 1
In Lipscomb v. Wells, 342 the father relied on both rumor and
bald eagle evidence to establish a timely paternity challenge. He
claimed he heard rumors that the mother saw another man around
the time of conception, that the mother told him he was not the
child's father, and that the child resembled a sibling from another
father. 343 The court relied on those facts, as well as the mother's
cutting off the relationship between the father and child after the
disclosure about his lack of paternity, in allowing the father to set
aside the paternity determination on the basis of the mother's
fraud. 34
The leap from bald eagle evidence to genetic evidence
came about with the Wise345 and Fairrow v. Fairrow346 cases. In
336 Id.
337 id.
338 Id. at 221.
339 See Sandberg, supra note 3.
340 McCann v. Guterl, 460 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983) order rev'd
by Jeanne M. v. Richard G., 465 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. App. 2 Dept. 1983). See
also Roberts v. Franklin, 688 So.2d 1181 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1996) (reviewing case
where the putative father claimed the child neither resembled his appearance or
?4ersonality as a basis for challenging paternity).4 1Id.
342 761 N.E.2d 218 (Il. App. Ct. 2001).
141 Id. at 220.
'44 Id. at 220, 222.
1 49 S.W.3d 450.
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both those cases, the fathers challenged paternity based on a new
form of bald eagle evidence - the lack of a resemblance on the
347inside. In Fairrow, the father challenged paternity eleven years
after he divorced the child's mother because tests showed that
neither had the gene for sickle cell anemia while their son did.348
Although the child tested positive for the gene at the time of his
birth, neither the father nor the mother tested for the gene at that
time.349 The mother eventually tested negative for the gene while
the father, who only saw the child on a handful of occasions during
the ten years after the parents divorced, was tested at the advice of
his physician when the child experienced symptoms related to
sickle cell anemia. 350 The Indiana Supreme Court relied on the
newly discovered genetic evidence and the fact that the father's
motivation to be tested for sickle cell anemia was not premised on
a desire to avoid child support in vacating the appellate court's
decision and remanding the case to grant the father's requested
relief.
351
Similarly, in Wise, the father tested negative for the cystic
fibrosis gene while his youngest son suffered from the disease,
making it impossible for him to be the child's biological parent, as
both parents must carry the gene for the disease to occur.352 Like
Fairrow, Wise also failed to test for the gene after learning his son
had cystic fibrosis, but rather waited until the child was seven
years old, around the same time he petitioned for custody of the
child, and claimed his former wife was not providing his son with
a healthy living environment.
353
As a result, the admissibility of DNA evidence to challenge
paternity has become the new impetus for challenging paternity -
bald eagle evidence for the inside.
Sometimes bald eagle evidence is used not to show how the
child differed from the father, but rather to establish that the father
had no reason to doubt the child's paternity until he noticed that
346 559 N.E.2d 597.
117 49 S.W.3d at 453; 559 N.E.2d at 598.
348 Id. at 598.
349 id.
350 id.
311 Id. at 599 - 600.
352 49 S.W.3d at 454.
13 Id. at 453-54.
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the child resembled a former boyfriend or friend of his wife or
girlfriend. That occurred in State Department of Human Resources
v. Shinal1354 when the father moved to set aside an administrative
order entered five years earlier adjudicating him to be the child's
father. Shinall alleged that he had no reason to believe he was not
the child's father until the child's mother noticed the resemblance
between the child and a second man whom the mother now
claimed, and DNA testing confirmed, was the father.355 Likewise,
the adjudicated father in Thomas v. Rosasco356 claimed he had no
reason to doubt the paternity of the child until after the support
order was entered and the child's mother informed him of the other
potential father who resembled the child.357 The McCann v.
Guter1i58 court also considered the father's bald eagle evidence
coupled with rumor and speculation that he heard the child's
mother was also dating a neighbor who had the same facial
features and coloring as the child in allowing the post-judgment
paternity challenge. 359 Even though the father in McCann waited
fifteen years to contest paternity, requested blood tests after having
little contact with the child and made no effort to support the child,
either financially or emotionally until that time, the court allowed
the blood tests.
360
Reliance on bald eagle evidence to support a biology-based
challenge encourages fathers to look at their children for their
differences and discourages fathers from seeing the similarities that
have nothing to do with biology, such as morals and environment.
If a child does not resemble the mother, there is no speculation as
to the child's lineage. When she does not resemble her father,
however, it is cause to set aside years of a parent-child relationship
just in case a biological connection is lacking.
"' 941 P.2d 616.
311 Id. at 618.
356 640 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
... Id. at 300.
358 460 N.Y.S.2d 223 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983).
9 Id. at 225.
'60 Id. at 226.
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D. Money Over Family - Biological Paternity
Challenges Reward Fathers for Abandoning Their
Children and Families
Proponents of paternity fraud laws argue that the "real"
biological father should pay child support to the child, not the
existing father. 36  Facially, the argument sounds palatable since
the law already creates an obligation on a biological parent to
provide support for his biological children. 362 It also assumes,
however, that the sole basis for paternal parenthood is biology.
Yet, the lack of a duty to support non-biological children is
the prevalent position in the movement behind paternity fraud
laws. Many of the men leading the movement first challenged the
paternity of their children in response to requests for increased
child support. 363  For example, Simmons, a Texas man who
challenged the paternity of his then thirteen-year-old son, did so in
response to the child's mother's request to increase child support.
At first, he responded by suggesting that his son live with himself
and his new family; however, less than six months after his son
moved into his home, Simmons ordered blood tests that excluded
him as his son's biological father. He then challenged paternity
and sought to vacate the child support order, which the Texas
courts denied. 3 4
Likewise, paternity fraud celebrity and self-proclaimed
victim, Carnell Smith, also made the decision to challenge his
thirteen-year-old daughter's paternity in March of 2000 after the
child's mother sought an increase in child support.365 In Smith's
case, members of his parish and friends advised him that he should
have DNA tests performed.366
361 See generally Goodman, supra note 308.
362 See supra notes 165 and 308 and accompanying text.
363 See Sandberg, supra note 3. See also R.L.T. v. S.V.P., 703 So.2d 1002, 1004
(Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Libro, 746 P.2d 632, 633 (Nev. 1987); Franzel, 516
N.W.2d at 496; Marriage of Kates, 761 N.E.2d 153, 158-159 (I11. 2001); Love,
959 P.2d 523, 525.
364 See Sandberg, supra note 3.
365 See Riccardi, supra note 3; Harris, supra note 187. See also Paternity of
Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 492 (involving a father's challenge of paternity when his
child support payment was increased).
366 See Riccardi, supra note 3; Harris, supra note 187.
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In Clevenger,367 a leading California case, the court
denounced the father who challenged paternity to alleviate his
child support obligation. In a scathing diatribe, the court noted:
There is an innate immorality in the conduct of an
adult who for over a decade accepts and proclaims a
child as his own, but then, in order to be relieved of
the child's support, announces, and relies upon, his
bastardy. This cruel weapon, which works a lasting
injury to the child and can bring in its aftermath
social harm .... should garner no profit to the
wielder;.. 368
Yet, the Clevenger court found no way to hold the father to
the parent-child relationship and relieved him of the obligations
and rights of fatherhood because there was no evidence that the
father actually told the child that he was his father. 369 Despite the
court's contempt for the father's financial motivation for
challenging paternity, it allowed him to avoid his financial and
emotional parental obligations.
In other cases, such as Hammack v Hammack,37° the father
made no secret of his motivation for contesting paternity. There,
the father lived in a marital family with his four children, ages nine
to eighteen, at the time he filed a post-judgment paternity
challenge. 371 In denying the father's motion, the court relied on
the father's self-proclaimed purpose to avoid his child support
obligations even though he had fought for custody two years
372earlier. The court reasoned that "a father should not be
permitted to bastardize children born during the marriage for his
367 189 Cal. App. 2d 658.
368 Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
369 Id. at 670-671.
370 737 N.Y.S.2d 702 (N.Y. App. Dist. 2002). See also McConnell v.
Berkheimer, 781 A.2d 206, 211 (Pa. Super. 2001) (estopping a father from
denying paternity where his only motivation to avoid paternity was to end his
financial obligation and he failed to contest paternity when the original child
support hearing was had.)
171 Id. at 703.
372 Id. at 704.
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own self-interest." 373 The tests, however, already took place, and
the court did not indicate whether the father or the children were
advised of the results. If so, the father could still abandon the
children, just not financially. Therefore, as the court noted, DNA
tests should not be ordered, especially where the father's motives
are financially motivated, until their admissibility or lack thereof is
adjudicated.374
Yet, in cases such as Judson v. Judson
375 and Thomas,376
the fathers wanted it both ways - they wanted to be fathers in the
social and emotional sense, but they did not want to incur the
corresponding financial obligation of being fathers. In Charles
Judson's divorce proceedings, the father denied paternity and
requested blood tests while at the same time sought custody of the
children. 377  The Judson court denied the father's motion for
paternity testing on equitable estoppel grounds since he raised the
children in the marital household for several years after they were
born and admitted they were children of the marriage until six
months into the divorce proceedings when he raised the challenge,
apparently motivated by financial concerns. 378
The Judson court took a "best interest of the children '379
stand and determined that the children would not be served by
having genetic testing done as it could potentially harm them and
their relationship with their father. 38  Instead, the court
condemned the father's self interest and cited Commonwealth v.
Weston,38 1 where the court described a similar father's attempts to
deny paternity as "inherently repulsive" when brought only after
373 Id., (citing Richard B. v. Sandra B., 625 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. I Dept.
1995), app. dismissed 662 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1995); Mancinelli v. Mancinelli,
610 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Matter of Campbell v. Campbell, 540
N.Y.S.2d 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
374 ibid. at 719, citing Prowda v. Wilner, 634 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995).
115 1995 WL 476848 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1995).
376 584 N.W.2d 421.
37 1995 WL 476848 at *1.
378 Id. at *4.
379 This article does not address the applicability of the best interest of the child
standard in paternity determinations.
380 id.
381 193 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 1963).
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the mother seeks child support. 382 In Judson, the potential harm to
the family was avoided. Even though the father wanted to destroy
his family, he was not allowed to do so because the court
recognized that the existence of a family was not founded on
biology, but on the relationship between the parents and the
children.
383
However, in Thomas, the court did not find the marital
father's desire to relieve himself of the financial obligations
384repulsive or immoral. Faced with two fathers who did not want
to be the legal father, the court found that the importance of not
impairing blood relationships obligated the biological father to be
deemed the child's legal father.385 The twist in that case was the
former husband's plea for visitation rights, which the court deemed
appropriate.
386
As the costs to raise a child continue to rise, the need for
additional child support will always exist as a motive to
disestablish paternity. It is a factor that cannot be alleviated in a
biological-privilege state. The argument that child support
obligations can be separated from paternity determinations because
children care about the relationship, not money 387 fails to consider
that the child needs both emotional and financial support to thrive.
If a father is allowed to maintain the father-child relationship but is
relieved of the financial obligation, someone else will have to
provide that support so the child and family can thrive.
While the biological father may be the logical choice,
imposing the obligations of parenthood on him in the form of
paying child support, health insurance and educational costs will
also trigger corresponding benefits of being a father. Since those
benefits, including custody or visitation, have been claimed by the
existing father, adding a third person to the mix creates time and
emotional concerns for the child. In that event, unlike a stepparent
who shares in the mother's time and responsibilities for the child,
the existing father and biological father would be competing for
382 Ibid., citing Weston, 193 A.2d at 783.
383 Id. at 5.
384 584 N.W.2d at 425.
385 Id. at 424-425.
3 6 Id. at 425.
387 See generally Charley Gillespie, When DNA test disproves paternity, should
child support stop?, AP NEWS, March 14, 2000.
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the child's time. Fatherhood is a package deal - it includes rights
and responsibilities that are intertwined to encourage the child's
growth and development and ensure the child has the financial and
emotional means necessary to become a productive adult.
While biology privilege proponents further argue that non-
biological children benefited from the past financial and emotional
support of the non-biological fathers,388 the children still suffer
economically and emotionally. Most importantly, however, is the
loss of the relationship with the father, something that history has
shown is inevitable once the pursuit of the dollar is put before the
salvation of the family. 389 This is bound to be a death knoll to the
family given the perception of a biologically-unrelated child as an
unjust financial strain 39 and child support as a financial prison.
391
E. Rewards a Lack of Diligence - Biology-Based
Paternity Decisions Encourage Fathers to Reap the
Rewards of a Family Without Undertaking Long-
Term Obligations of Parenthood
A biology-based privilege approach to paternity also
rewards fathers who do little to pursue their legal remedies until
their pocketbooks are being taxed by the garnishment of their
wages.
39 2
Under this approach, the father in State ex rel. Russell,
393
who waited ten years after the divorce proceeding before
challenging his son's paternity would not be barred by res
judicata. 39 A pure biology privilege state would allow him to wait
388 See Rogers, supra note 109 at 1173.
389 See Wachter, 550 A.2d 1019; Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726. See also supra notes
268-321 and accompanying text.
390 See Tesser, supra note 304.
391 See Dianna Thompson, DNA Evidence: Enough to Exonerate Dads?,
CNSNews.com Commentary, April 11, 2002; Goodman, supra note 308; Smith,
SuPra note 20 at 43. See also Sandberg, supra note 3; Harris, supra note 187.
39 See Love, 959 P.2d at 525; State ex rel. A.T. v. E.W., 695 So.2d 624 (Ala.
1997).
393 2003 WL 1787326.
394 See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 795 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. 2002); Weidman v.
Weidman, 808 A.2d 576 (Pa. Super. 2002); J.M. v. S.M., 2001 WL 721831
(Mass. App. 2001); State ex rel. J.Z., 668 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1995); Scott v. Scott,
1983 WL 35759 (Del. Super. 1983); Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. App.
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until he no longer wants to play daddy or until the child's mother
seeks an increase in child support to challenge the child's
paternity. This would allow him to destroy his family at his
discretion, when it suits him to punish his ex-wife or girlfriend for
perceived wrongs or when the new girlfriend or wife wants to start
a family of her own and needs every bit of his income to do so.
Similarly, the father in Libro learned that he was not the
child's biological father through blood type tests five years before
he challenged paternity.395 Even then, he only challenged paternity
when, after he stopped paying child support, the child's mother
filed an action to reduce the arrearages to a judgment against
him.396 The court, applying a paternity fraud theory, found that the
father did not contest paternity during the divorce because he was
"[1]ulled by ignorance of the true facts..." 397 The court ignored the
father's lack of diligence, in failing to act on the knowledge that he
was biologically unrelated to the child for the previous five years.
Instead, the court focused on what it called the "egregious" facts
that caused the father's ignorance, and how it prevented him from
a "fair opportunity to litigate paternity in the divorce
proceedings."
398
In doing so, the court rewarded the husband's lack of
diligence under the guise of punishing the mother's fraudulent
concealment. At no time did the court address the father's
obligation to challenge paternity within a reasonable time upon
learning of the lack of a biological relationship with the child. Nor
did the court consider the impact the five-year delay had on the
child's emotional well-being and the family. Essentially, it
1987); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 44 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2002); Pietros v. Pietros, 638
A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994); Decker v. Hunter, 460 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 3 Dist. App.
1984); Wright v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 1996); Anderson, 746 So.2d
525 (Fla. 2 Dist. App. 1999); Wise, 49 S.W.3d 450. See also Lynn v. Powell,
809 A.2d 927 (Pa. Super. 2002) (Estopping the wife from overcoming the
presumption of paternity). This article acknowledges the effect res judicata and
paternity or equitable estoppel have on post-judgment paternity challenges;
however, where biology is privileged, they do not come into play, and, are
therefore not addressed in this article.
195 746 P.2d at 633.
396 id.
397 id.
398 Id. at 634.
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sanctioned his lack of diligence by relieving him of the support
obligation.Likewise, the fathers in both Fairrow399 and Wise40 0 could
have tested for the sickle cell anemia and cystic fibrosis genes,
respectively, long before they did. Neither claimed to lack the
knowledge that they had to carry the gene to be the biological
father of their children. Rather, they waited, without reason, until,
at least in Wise's case, the child was seven years old and had a
relationship with him where he visited his son, sought custody of
him, and was the only father the child knew.40 1 If Wise filed his
petition in a state that applied a complete biological privilege, he
could wait until the child was eighteen, test for the gene, deny
paternity, seek reimbursement from the child's biological father for
past child support and do to the child then what he did when the
child was seven - tell them they are not really his children.
F. Encourages Perjury - The Ends Justify the Means
When Biology Prevails
While all laws that provide a financial incentive are
susceptible to perjury, paternity fraud laws encourage it in search
for a biological truth. For example, in Wachter,4 02 the father
claimed he would continue to support the child regardless of the
outcome of the genetic testing but petitioned to set aside the child
support order as soon as he learned he was excluded as the child's
biological father. The implication is that he lied. Although the
court never commented on the father's motives nor did it accuse
him of misrepresenting, through his attorney, the truth, it is just as
likely that he lied to get the court to order the testing as it is that he
was just curious to know the child's biological paternity. While it
is possible that his feelings changed once he was confronted with
the lack of a biological connection to the child, it is also possible
that his motive was to dispose of his child support obligation from
the start.
'99 559 N.E.2d 597.
40u 49 S.W.3d 450.
401 Id. at 452-53.
402 550 A.2d at 1020.
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Ironically, it is such misrepresentations, when done by the
mother, that are the source of much of the passion behind the push
for paternity fraud laws - to stop the mothers from making
misrepresentations.n°3
Any case before the court on a paternity challenge poses
the same question: Has the father fabricated newly discovered
evidence or his motive for challenging paternity to avoid his child
support obligations? Answering the question in Wise,404 Mr. Wise
claimed he tested because he did not have cystic fibrosis and
wanted to know if he was a carrier of the gene.4 °5 What was there
to know? If he believed he was the child's biological father, there
would be no reason to have the test; he would have to be a carrier,
just as his wife would. He has not denied that he knew the biology
behind cystic fibrosis - that he was unaware before the child was
seven that he had to be a carrier of the disease or the child could
not have it. So, why then?
Why test on the heels of a petition to modify custody in
your favor? Because he was curious - "he wanted 'to see if [he]
was a carrier of cystic fibrosis. ' ''406 Why wasn't he curious when
the child was born? Because he was happily married at the time?
Then why not at the time of divorce? He certainly was not happily
married then. Although the courts can do little more than surmise
the motives of fathers seeking to disestablish paternity, when the
challenge comes in response to a request to increase child support,
a wage garnishment action, or contempt proceedings, the father's
motives are less in doubt; they are financially motivated.
G. He Says, She Says - A Biology-Based Paternity
System Favors Men's Interests Over the Family's
Biological privilege laws also often create a privilege for
men over women. 407 For example, the Alabama paternity fraud
law 4°8 provides that:
403 See Paternityfraud.com.
404 49 S.W.3d at 454.
405 id.
406 Id.
407 See D.S.M. v. L.M., 2002 WL 1880702 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)(Indicating in a
concurring opinion that Alabama's five-year-statute of limitations on
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Upon petition of the defendant ... where the
defendant has been declared the legal father...the
case shall be reopened if there is scientific evidence
presented by the defendant that he is not the father.
The Alabama statute does not allow a woman or even the
child to open a paternity case. The Alabama appellate court upheld
this position, denying the child's mother's petition to contest the
child's paternity where the former husband asserted a right to
continue his relationship with the child in S. W.M. v. D. W.M.
409
The S. W.M. court reiterated the trial court's lengthy anti-
fraud policy discussion and indicated that a mother would not be
entitled to these protections because she "would obviously at least
have reason to suspect that her husband or 'steady' boyfriend just
might not be the biological father." and could seek testing when
paternity was originally established.4  Determining that the plain
language of the statute did not intend to bestow the same rights on
the mother as the father, the court avoided the mother's claim that
this provision denied her equal protection rights because she did
not raise the argument at the trial level.41'
Because the biological-privilege is based on an assumption
that women know the biology of the child but the father does not, it
offsets that situation by giving the father the power to challenge
paternity to the exclusion of the mother. It also sets a precedent
that the father's interests are more important than the mother's, the
child's and the family's.
disestablishing paternity allows the presumed father to do so beyond the five-
year period but not the natural mother.)
408 Ala. Code § 26-17A-I (a) (1994) (emphasis added).
4' 723 So.2d 1271 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
41
1 Id. at 1272.
411 Id. at 1272- 73.
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IV. "You DIVORCE WIVES, NOT CHILDREN ' 4 12 - A
STATUTORY PROPOSAL CHANGING THE Focus FROM
MEN TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN PATERNITY
DETERMINATIONS
This article argues that the relationship with the child, the
focal point of the family, creates a family relationship, not the
parents' relationship with each other.413  This psychological,
functional, factual or developed relationship between a parent and
child does not rely on biology for its inception or growth. 414 It is
born of love and grows on "companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, fulfill[ing] the child's psychological .... as well as
physical needs. 415
The solution to the monetary motivation is simple -
eliminate the temptation; the reward. The Comments to the
American Law Institute Principles on Family Dissolution law
suggest that if fathers were not allowed to challenge child support,
they would lose their motive to challenge paternity.4 16 It states:
[A] husband estopped to deny a support obligation
under this section may understandably choose to
relinquish his inquiry into biological paternity in
order to enjoy a parental relationship with the child
he is required to support.417
This is a logical assumption given cases such as Clevenger,
Hammack, Judson, and Smith, where the desire to eliminate the
412 Clueless was a 1995 Paramount Pictures movie that included social
commentary on the American family in the 1990s.
413 The concept of a parental relationship with the child is known as a developed
relationship, psychological relationship or functioning relationship. I agree with
the principle that the relationship, not biology, should be determinative of
parentage. That principle is the foundation for the definition of the family in
this article, as well as the relationship the proposed statute is designed to protect.
414 See Garrison, supra note 181 at 447.
415 id.
416 Glennon, supra note 73 at 278, citing Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations Sec. 3.02A cmt. d (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2000) (ALl).
417 id.
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child support obligation motivated the paternity challenge.41 8 It is
not a fool-proof solution as fathers often abandon their children
even when their wages are garnished or walk away from the
children based on doubts, rumors or innuendos alone. Hopefully,
however, it would take away some of the monetary incentive to
abandon children and preserve whatever family exists.
In addition, just because science allows society to know
something with certainty does not mean that it benefits society or
the individual to know that information. For example, if a child
has a predisposition for a disease that has no cure and there is no
way to determine whether the disease will actually manifest itself,
knowing he has the gene will only create anxiety in the child,
parents and family. Likewise, when a child with an established
father-child relationship is told the man he called father for the past
sixteen years is biologically unrelated to him and no longer wants
to be his father creates no benefit to the child, just harm. As Paula
Roberts of the Center for Law and Social Policy stated:
[S]cience has given us the ability to do something
we maybe shouldn't do.. .What you're really saying
is that all a man is, in terms of a father to a child, is
419a sperm donor....
The solution is the same - remove the parents' ability to obtain
biological heritage information that history has proven consistently
causes the existing father to abandon his children and leave the
child's family without the emotional and financial support
necessary to thrive. This is an exception to a generally accepted
concept in the law to seek the truth because, in the paternity
setting, the truth is contrary to the societal goals of paternity
determinations - to provide the child with emotional and financial
security, certainty and stability. Instead, the truth destroys familial
relationships, creates doubt as to a child's parentage and leaves the
child and family without the financial support necessary to survive.
Likewise, the certainty that genetic testing and biological-
privilege laws create results in uncertainty and instability in the
418 Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707; Judson, 1995 WL 476848; Hammack, 737
N.Y.S.2d 702. See also McConnell, 781 A.2d at 211; Weston, 193 A.2d 782.
419 Riccardi, supra note 3.
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child's life. Instead, biological certainty leaves a child in limbo
during his minority, exposes him to biologically-related strangers,
and causes families and relationships to fail where they once
flourished. To avoid the harm biological certainty creates for
children, the proposed statute creates certainty by acknowledging
the established father-child relationship as the preference in
paternity determinations, ensuring that the potential uncertainty a
biological privilege creates cannot occur.
Finally, because families are no longer constrained by the
bounds of marriage, the statute proposed in this article
acknowledges that the source of a family is the relationship
between the parents and children, not the relationship between the
parents. In doing so, the impetus of a family, the child, is
protected over the parents.
The proposed statute accomplishes all of these goals by: 1)
limiting genetic testing to situations where there is no developed
father-child or parent-child (in same-sex families) relationship; 2)
punishing fathers and others who seek or aide in illegal testing for
the purpose of disturbing the father-child or parent-child and
family relationships; and 3) creating criminal responsibility for
disclosing information about a child's biological heritage that is
inconsistent with his familial relationships for the purpose of
destroying those relationships. As a result, while some fathers may
still abandon their children, because the incentives and impetus for
doing so are removed, fathers will be encouraged to continue the
father-child relationship, ensuring stability, certainty and support
for the child and family.
A. The Statute
Section 100. Purpose of Statute
Recognizing a need to create both certainty and finality in paternity
decisions for the benefit of the child and family, this statute
codifies the developed relationship approach to paternity. The
developed relationship approach to paternity acknowledges the
family, and, more importantly, the parent-child relationship as the
basis for paternity over biology except in cases where no such
relationship exists or existed during the child's minority.
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Comment:
Rather than focus on children with no paternal parent-child
relationship, a situation easily solved by genetic testing, this statute
concentrates on the scenario where an existing relationship is being
challenged. It is necessary to do so given the lack of consistency
from state to state on this issue; some allow the relationship to be
set aside in favor of biology or a lack thereof regardless of the
marital or family status, while others protect the marital
presumption only while the parents' relationship and the marriage
is intact, and still others protect the family regardless of the
parents' relationship.42 °
Understanding that paternity is connected to child support,
visitation, custody and other legal rights and responsibilities,4  this
statute is designed to protect the child's and family's rights and
responsibilities, not the individual's, based on the established
familial relationship between the parent and child. To do so,
stability and finality have to be fostered as both children and adults
422
need certainty in their family relationships. That certainty is
ensured by not allowing a child's father or parent to challenge
parentage or even obtain genetic information or information
regarding possible paternity under any circumstances.
Although proponents of the biological privilege would
argue that such an approach is unfair to the father 2 and unjust to
424
the child, depriving him of a biological relationship, they do not
consider that children do not identify parental relationships by
genes but rather by what they know - that a father is more than a
"sperm donor." Likewise, arguments that if the father challenges
paternity, the family has probably already dissolved42 5 do not
consider that many families exist without the white picket fence
fantasy - surviving remarriage of one or both parents.
420 See Ince, 58 S.W.3d at 191 (noting that parenthood "has always meant more
than simply proving the DNA necessary to create human life originated from a
particular individual.").
421 Shapiro, Reifler & Psome, supra note 88, at 7.
422 Bartlett, supra note 147, at 903.
423 Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4, at 220; Roberts, supra note 109, at 54.
424 Roberts, supra note 109, at 54.
425 See Dallas, supra note 247, at 371.
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In addition, in order to protect the child from the anger of
one parent towards the other, as well as from lawyers who
advise fathers to end their relationships with their children, the
incentive for such conduct must be taken away. Removing the
incentive for a father to deny paternity of a child with whom he has
a relationship will encourage responsible conduct on his part
towards his children and family. 4 27 Then, the relationship can
maintain the family.
Section 101. Limited Genetic Testing When Parent-Child
Relationships Exist.
A. A court, administrative agency, special master or other
individual or entity adjudicating paternity shall not order
genetic, blood, or other tests where:
1. The evidence establishes that there is a developed
relationship between the child and the person
contesting his role as father or other parent;
2. The father could have submitted to genetic or other
blood tests in a prior paternity proceeding or when
filing an acknowledgement of paternity but chose to
forego that right;
3. The father was aware of the possibility that he was
not the child's biological parent when he either:
a. Filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity;
b. Allowed his name to be placed on the child's birth
certificate;
c. Gave the child his surname;
d. Married the child's mother;
e. Cohabitated with the child's mother;
f. Acknowledged the child on any public,
employment, insurance or government record,
including but not limited to:
i. Life insurance applications or beneficiary
designations;
ii. Health insurance;
iii. Social Security benefits;
426 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4, at 220.
427 See Harris, supra note 187, at 485.
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iv. Welfare benefits;
v. Workers Compensation benefits;
vi. School records;
vii. Doctors, Dentists or other medical
provider records;
viii. Child care records; or
g. Took a role as caregiver, father, parent, or the
equivalent in the child's life in any traditional or
non-traditional family unit.
4. The child's mother and father were married or
attempted to marry before or after the child's birth
and a parent-child relationship existed for any
significant period of time, including as little as one
year, regardless of whether the parent lived in the
same household as the child;
5. The child's mother and father cohabitated either
before or after the child's birth and a parent-child
relationship existed for any significant period of time,
including as little as one year, regardless of whether
the parent lived in the same household as the child;
6. The child's mother and father engaged in intimate
sexual conduct near the time of the child's conception
and a parent-child relationship existed for any
significant period of time, including as little as one
year, regardless of whether the parent lived in the
same household as the child;
7. The child was conceived by artificial insemination
upon the agreement of the mother and father or other
parent and a parent-child relationship existed for any
significant period of time, including as little as one
year, regardless of whether the father or other parent
lived in the same household as the child;
8. The child was conceived through a surrogate
agreement of the mother and father or other parent
and a parent-child relationship existed for any
significant period of time, including as little as one
year, regardless of whether the parent lived in the
same household as the child;
9. The child was adopted by the mother and father or
other parent and a parent-child relationship existed
20031 135
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for any significant period of time, including as little
as one year, regardless of whether the parent lived in
the same household as the child; or
10. The father failed to appear for genetic testing when
ordered to do so by the court.
B. The court shall consider the following factors428 in
determining whether a parent-child relationship exists
between the father and the child:
1. The length of time the father/parent in question acted
in the capacity of a father/parent role;
2. The nature of the relationship between the child and
the father/parent;
3. The child's age;
4. The emotional connection between the child and the
father/parent;
5. The role the father/parent played in the child's life,
considering the father's/parent's role in caring for the
emotional, financial and other needs of the child;
6. The child's emotional attachment to the father/parent;
and
7. Any other factor that may affect equities arising from
the disruption of the father-child or parent-child
relationship or the chance of other harm to the child.
C. Genetic tests are appropriate where:
1. The child reaches the age of majority and desires to
know his biological heritage and the evidence
establishes that the child's father may not be his
biological parent, except where:
a. The child's father opposes the tests; or
b. The child's father is deceased;
2. The child has a medical condition that cannot be
treated without testing the father for the disease.
D. In the event that it is determined that a man other than the
child's father is the biological father of the child, the court
shall prevent the dissemination of the information to
428 These are some of the factors contained in the UPA § 608 (2002) and other
states. See also WASH REV. CODE § 26.26.535 (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE §
160.608.
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anyone other than the child upon the age of majority or
medical professionals to further the treatment of the child.
E. There shall be no right to terminate the parent-child
relationship, to terminate child support, or for
reimbursement of previously incurred support or other
costs.
Comment:
This Section eliminates the problems created by a
biological privilege system by eliminating the availability of self-
help genetic testing and limiting genetic testing to those cases
where there is no family unit, traditional or otherwise, to protect.
Instead, it protects existing families, which include families of
divorce because "[y]ou divorce wives, not children,, 429 as well as
nontraditional families where the parents do not cohabitate or
marry or between same-sex couples but where the father or parent
has a developed relationship with the child, creating a family unit.
Limiting the availability to obtain genetic testing to those
situations where it would be admissible, such as where there is no
husband, former husband or father who has a relationship with the
child, will curb the instances of fathers abandoning or neglecting
430their children. It will also prevent siblings from dealing with a
split in the family as no child will receive the benefits of the
existing father-child relationship to the exclusion of another. If the
suspicion remains just that, there is at least a chance that it will
dissipate. This was evident when Morgan Wise told his children
that he was not their father in violation of the court's order that he
not disclose that information to the children. Although he was
penalized by the court and lost visitation rights for two years, the
damage was already done.43'
While this Section limits the parents' ability to know the
biological truth of a child's paternity, which has generally been
favored by the courts and legislature,432 it does so to protect the
429 See supra note 412.
430 See Wachter, 550 A.2d 1019, 1021 (Pa. Super. 1988).
431 Boccella, supra note 12. See also Linda Kane, Biological warfare: when the
DNA bomb is dropped, THE LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, June 17, 2001.
432 See Garst, 2003 WL 1571704 (Relying on the public policy of determining
the truth, which the court indicates "is the best way to foster healthy
relationships."); Ince, 58 S.W.3d at 194, Vance, J., dissenting.
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child and the family that exists by virtue of the parent-child
relationship, regardless of the marital status, living arrangements,
or ongoing relationship between the child's parents. It
acknowledges that a family is created by relationships, not biology,
and that the societal goal should be to preserve the family
relationship in any form that is beneficial to the child over a truth
that destroys it.
As a result, a list of factors is provided for the court to
consider in determining whether a father-child relationship exists
that must be protected. The list is not exhaustive in order to leave
open the possibility that some unanticipated fact could establish
the parent-child relationship.
There are only two exceptions to this sweeping rule
prohibiting genetic testing when there is a parent-child
relationship: 1) A child may request the information upon reaching
the age of majority for self identity purposes; and 2) A court may
order tests when a medical condition mandates that the parents be
tested to pursue a course of treatment to save the child's life.
This would not include the type of post-disease testing that
Morgan Wise did for cystic fibrosis and the father in Fairrow433
underwent for sickle cell anemia as neither test would further the
treatment of the child. In both circumstances, the tests could serve
no medical purpose for the child's benefit. The children had
already contracted the diseases and could not be cured or treated
with the knowledge obtained by testing their fathers. The only
thing the tests could establish was the lack of a genetic connection
between the children and their fathers.
The other situation where genetic testing is permitted under
this Section is where there is no established family or father-child
relationship. In those circumstances, testing is appropriate to
identify the child's father, leaving the door open to a potential
father-child relationship. There is no need to do that when the
father or familial relationship has already been identified by virtue
of a relationship with the child. Because fathers should not be
encouraged to abandon the relationship with their children to gain
a legal advantage in a subsequent challenge to paternity, 434 once
433 Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1990).
434 See Richard B. v. Sandra B., 625 N.Y.S.2d 127, 138 (N.Y. App. I Dept.
1995), app. dismissed 662 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1995).
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there is a developed relationship, it cannot be legally set aside.
This provision is geared at removing the incentive for pursuing a
paternity challenge once a relationship exists.
This Section also promotes certainty and finality in the
paternity setting. While, arguably, DNA evidence also creates
certainty in paternity, the uncertainty DNA testing subjects the
child to while the traditional family or marriage is intact is
removed by this Section. Once the parent-child relationship exists,
the child and father can be certain that the courts will uphold the
relationship. Under this Section, the child will have no reason to
question whether his father will abandon him when the parents no
longer desire a relationship. In addition, a father will have no
reason to doubt the child's paternity because he will know with
certainty that his relationship with his child is secure, neither
subject to attacks by the child's mother or a third party. The
family will also benefit because it will survive the parental break
up.
Two collateral benefits of this Section are: 1) Perjury by the
father will be discouraged because it will have no impact on the
outcome of a paternity case where there is an existing parent-child
relationship; and 2) Speculation, rumor and bald eagle evidence
will be eliminated once and for all. Under this section, it does not
matter whose genes created the child or who the child does or does
not resemble. It only matters who cared for, supported, and
committed emotional and financial support to the child - the
child's father or parent.
Section 200. Penalties for Self-Help Testing or Disclosure of
Non-Paternity
A. It shall be illegal to obtain or assist in obtaining any genetic
testing without a court order.
B. Any parent, which, for purposes of this Section, shall be
construed to include any father, mother, grandparent, same-
sex partner or other individual in a parent-child relationship
with the child, who seeks self-help testing, including any
genetic testing obtained without a court order, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor offense punishable by not less
than forty-five days and not more than one hundred and
eighty days in jail and shall be required to pay additional
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child support for the child to cover any counseling
necessary, or which may become necessary due to
subjecting the child to doubt and uncertainty about his
parentage. The amount shall be equal to half a month's
child support for a period of no less than one year.
C. Any parent who, after illegally obtaining self-help genetic
testing in violation of this section, or upon suspicion or
actual knowledge of biological non-paternity, discloses the
results of those tests or the fact of non-paternity to any
individual, including but not limited to the child, the child's
mother, the child's father (established by the parent-child
relationship), the child's siblings, or the child's
grandparents, aunts, uncles or any other relations, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor offense punishable by not less
than ninety days and not more than one year in jail and
shall be required to pay additional child support for the
child to cover any counseling necessary, or which may
become necessary due to subjecting the child to doubt and
uncertainty about his parentage. The amount shall be equal
to double each month's child support for a period of no less
than one year.
D. Any individual who assists in obtaining self-help genetic or
other tests for the purpose of determining or disestablishing
paternity when there is an established father-child or
parent-child relationship shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by not less than forty-five days and not more
than one hundred and eighty days in jail and shall be
required to pay a fine not less than one thousand dollars to
compensate the child for any emotional or other damages
caused by the testing.
E. Any individual who, after the parent illegally obtains self-
help genetic testing in violation of this section, discloses or
assists in disclosing the results of those tests to any
individual, including but not limited to the child, the child's
mother, the child's father (established by the parent-child
relationship), the child's siblings, or the child's
grandparents, aunts, uncles or any other relations, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor offense punishable by not less
than ninety days and not more than one year in jail and
shall be required to pay a fine of not less than three
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thousand dollars to compensate the child for any emotional,
psychological or other damages caused by the disclosure of
the test results.
F. A court may, in its discretion, impose additional penalties
on the parent or any individual assisting the parent,
including loss of driver's, professional and other licenses
and community service, as deemed appropriate by the court
according to the facts of the case.
Comment:
Just as paternity fraud laws seek to punish women who
misrepresent or omit potential information regarding the biological
parentage of their children, so, too should the laws punish men and
women who, even at the advice of their attorneys, disestablish or
abandon the relationship with their children in an attempt to show
that there is no family to protect. This Section does just that -
punish fathers and mothers who disclose genetic paternity in an
effort to advance their individual interests before their family's
interests.
In addition, to deter self-help genetic testing, genetic testing
to determine paternity must be illegal and it must involve penalties
that will impact the parent's rights significantly, just as self-help
testing impacts the child's life. When Wise told his children he
was not their father, the court imposed a significant punishment,
depriving him of visitation with his children for two years.
Although severe, the act of disobeying the court order and telling
the children he was not their father was also severe. The loss of
visitation rights was especially devastating to Wise as he sought to
maintain a relationship with the children he disclaimed. The
punishment seems harsh, and, in some sense, may serve to
disestablish the family relationship this proposal seeks to preserve;
however, Mr. Wise already disestablished his family when he told
the children he raised, fought for and had custody of at various
times, that they were not his and attempted to avoid the financial
responsibilities associated with his membership in their family.
Therefore, a man who discloses knowledge he should not have in
the first place should be punished financially and socially.
Denying a father visitation for a month or making him
serve time in jail when he seeks self-help testing in violation of the
law may deter the father from making the decision to end the
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family unit. Undoubtedly, there will still be fathers who walk
away from their children when they walk away from their
children's mother, but, perhaps, it will curb some of the
psychological damage to the children by eliminating the
uncertainty that the abandonment can include when accompanied
by a full-blown paternity challenge wrought with genetic testing,
innuendos of infidelity and potential additional biological parents.
The penalties proposed in this statute recognize the need
for both criminal and financial incentives to prevent the resulting
harm to the child. Making self-help testing a crime is not a novel
suggestion. 435 Although proponents of a biological privilege may
argue that fathers will still seek self-help testing just as women
sought back-alley abortions when abortion was illegal, especially
because tests can be obtained from all over the world through the
internet,436 it is less likely that a man will risk doing so if he knows
he will lose his driver's, medical, or legal license or will incur jail
time and a hefty fine. Therefore, the penalty for self-help testing
has to be a matter of deterrence 437 because, no matter what the risk,
some men will seek self-help testing anyway.438 The goal is to
deter the desire to seek this testing as much as possible to preserve
the family.
One of the objectives of subsections C and E of this Section
is to remove the incentive for a former spouse to suddenly disclose
the father's non-paternity to the child to deter a custody battle or
visitation request as envisioned by the court in Day v. Heller.
4 39
435 The possibility of criminalizing testing without the mother's consent or a
court order has been contemplated in England, as well. Bentham & Fraser,
supra note 234. See also Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 4 at 228, citing
comments to earlier drafts of the UPA (2002).
436 See www.worldwidepaternity.com (offering $175 in home DNA tests and
$390 legal DNA tests, both of which are advertised as ninety-nine percent
accurate).
437 Perjury charges for mothers who knowingly name a man who is not the
biological father in cases where there is no family via a father-child relationship
is not addressed in this statute as additional laws should be enacted to address
the scenario where the child does not have an established father.
438 "Many of the most difficult cases arise because a parent takes a child for
'self-help' testing and then uses the existence or non-existence of a biological
connection as a battering ram on public opinion, the courts, and, far too often,
even the child to obtain 'justice."' Robinson & Paikin, supra note 22 at 25.
439 653 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Neb. 2002).
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Again, although this provision encourages concealment of the
biological truth, it does so to preserve a conflicting truth that is not
dependent on the biological truth - the parent-child relationship
and family.
Section 300. Civil and Criminal Liability of Testing Companies
A. Any genetic, DNA or other laboratory that conducts genetic
or other blood tests for the purpose of, or with the effect of,
determining paternity or the lack thereof that conducts or
offers to conduct such testing without a court order shall be
subject to a punitive penalty of thirty thousand dollars and
punitive damages payable to the child on the first offense
and loss of their business or other license and punitive
damages payable to the child for the second offense.
B. Any individual who works at a laboratory that conducts
genetic or other blood tests for the purpose of, or with the
effect of, determining paternity or the lack thereof that
conducts or aids in such testing without a court order shall
forfeit any medical license and shall be subject to the same
penalties as any individual who assists in self-help testing
in Section 200 of this Statute.
Comment:
The same rationale that governs individuals governs
corporations and other entities offering illegal self-help testing
under this statute. Punitive damages are appropriate for the willful
violation of the law that causes damages to the child, whether
quantifiable or not. There is no doubt that testing labs' motivations
is purely financial and not humanitarian. They make money by
fostering doubt where there is none and destroying the floundering
family that needs a life preserver, not an anchor as evidenced by
billboards and internet advertisements that encourage genetic
testing in the context of avoiding child support obligations. As
such, the logical penalty for violating the law, as proposed in this
article, would be to penalize them as the legal system does
corporations who violate the law or act in reckless disregard for the
rights of others; hit them with punitive damages. In this case, a
three-strikes law is too lenient. Penalizing illegal genetic testing
laboratories fiscally once should be the only warning. The second
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time they provide illegal genetic testing, they should suffer the
same fate as that family and lose their license - permanently. Just
as the family cannot survive a biological blow, nor should the
testing company.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A biological privilege in paternity determinations may
establish the truth of the child's genes, but it fails to acknowledge
that parents are created by the parent-child relationship, not by
genetics. While history suggests that biology has always been the
impetus for adjudicating who a child's legal father is, it also
suggests that when there is already an established father-child
relationship, biology creates a flawed paternity at the cost of the
child and family. Rather than pursue a genetic truth for the benefit
of the father's financial status, the courts and legislatures should
preserve the parent-child relationship and family that develops as a
result of that relationship. To protect the family, the courts and
legislatures have to do two things: 1) acknowledge that not all
families end with divorce or start with marriage; and 2) create laws
that not only discourage, but prohibit fathers and other parents
from abandoning the parent-child or familial relationships
regardless of the child's genetic heritage. The statute proposed in
this article would satisfy both of those components.
While subordinating genetic truth to family preservation is
contrary to long-held beliefs that the courts and statutes should
pursue a truth in disputes, as sociobiologists have acknowledged
that the end of the intimate relationship between the parents often
ends even biological parental relationships, the significance of the
biological truth does not necessarily preserve the family. 440 While
there is no guarantee that a father will not abandon his child under
any statute, the proposed statute would deter unnecessary doubts
about paternity by acknowledging that a parent who remains in a
child's life after the relationship with the child's mother subsides is
more important than one who plays no role in the child's life other
than in the capacity as a sperm donor.
When biology prevails, the child and family suffer. Even
when a father's initial motives are not financial, once the DNA test
440 See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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excludes him as the child's biological parent, money and anger at
the child's mother replace the love and history of the parent-child
relationship, harming the child and family. When the parent-child
relationship prevails, there is no reason for the father to doubt his
role in the family because he defines it by his relationship with the
child. Therefore, to save the parent-child relationship, the child
and family must come before corporate profits of DNA testing
labs, the father's financial self-interest, the mother's desire for a
clean break from the other parent and a flawed biological
preference. Only then will the family survive.
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